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PLAINTIFF'S REMEDY WHEN A 




Contempt is the remedy imposed on a defendant for violating a 
judicially recognized right or obligation. A contempt order may be of 
three types: coercive, criminal, or compensatory. Courts employ coer-
cive contempt to secure a plaintiffs substantive right. Coercive con-
tempt is equity's equivalent of a writ of execution. When a defendant 
refuses to obey a personal order, the judge utilizes coercive tactics, in-
cluding fines and imprisonment. Coercive contempt is prospective; it 
seeks to effect future obedience. In contrast, criminal. and compensa-
tory contempt are retrospective; they respond to past violations. 1 
Judges use criminal and compensatory contempt when it is too late to 
coerce the defendant into the desired mode of conduct. 
If a defendant willfully disobeys an injunction, a judge may im-
pose criminal contempt in the form of a fine or imprisonment. The 
punishment expresses society's concern that people obey court orders. 
Coercive and criminal contempt judges wield the same tools. We dis-
tinguish criminal and coercive contempt by their goals. Coercive con-
tempt is indeterminate; courts apply it until the defendant has complied 
with the court order. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, responds 
to harm the contemnor has already committed. To correct a public 
wrong, the authorities impose a fixed and determinate sanction. 
Compensatory contempt is a money award for the plaintiff when 
the defendant has injured the plaintiff by violating an injunction. 
Compensatory and coercive contempt are both civil sanctions. We dis-
tinguish civil from criminal contempt on two grounds: civil contempt 
must conform to civil procedures and criminal contempt is adminis-
tered within the framework of criminal procedures. Civil contempt 
benefits the plaintiff directly while criminal contempt is the state's 
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1968, University of Iowa; LL.M. 
1970, University of Michigan. The author thanks Cynthia Carter, Jean Wyant, Howard Hill and 
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1. Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1344 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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method of punishing a recalcitrant without benefiting opposing liti-
gants directly. Compensatory contempt resembles coercive and crimi-
nal contempt in that it requires the defendant to pay money damages. 
Unlike either coercive or criminal contempt, however, compensatory 
contempt transfers the money damages to the plaintiff. The contemnor, 
moreover, is never imprisoned. 
Both criminal and compensatory contempt are retrospective; each 
form of contempt is designed to punish or remedy past harm, as distin-
guished from coercive contempt, which seeks to assure future compli-
ance. Like tort and criminal laws, which also impose sanctions for past 
antisocial conduct, the differences between compensatory and criminal 
contempt grow out of both purpose and remedy. The general goals of 
criminal contempt are to punish and deter, as well as to vindicate the 
public interest in obedience to court orders. It may also benefit the 
plaintiff incidentally. In contrast, the goal of compensatory contempt is 
to indemnify the plaintiff directly for the harm the contemnor caused 
by breaching the injunction. Courts utilize compensatory contempt to 
restore the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his original position. The 
remedy is not penal, but rather remediaP Courts measure compensa-
tory contempt by evidence of reimbursable loss. 3 The terms "punish-
ment" and "fine" fail to define a compensatory contempt award 
adequately.4 
Courts apply the compensatory contempt remedy most often for 
violation of an injunction.5 Like other remedies, compensatory con-
tempt is designed to further the underlying substantive law.6 Because 
different forms of substantive law underlie the various injunctions, ap-
plication of compensatory contempt in the context of rigidly-defined 
2. Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 457 (1932). 
3. National Drying Mach. Co. v. Ackotf, 245 F.2d 192, 193 (3d Cir. 1957) (Courts use the 
term "actual loss."). 
4. Cf Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112 (1922) ("punishment" means compen-
sation); United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Mont. 1957) ("punishment" 
ambiguous); Holloway v. Peoples Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265 (1917) (restitution is not a 
fine). But see 4 WEsT's FEDERAL FoRMS 5653 (1970) (civil contempt form asks judge to punish 
contemnor). 
5. For example, many leading compensatory contempt opinions grew out of injunctions 
protecting the statutory monopolies: copyrights and patents. Compensatory contempt also results 
from violations of injunctions protecting trade secrets, Glo-Klen Co. v. Far West Chern. Prods., 
Inc., 53 Wash. 2d 9, 330 P.2d 180 (1958); trademarks, Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 572 
(E.D. Mo. 1972); and contracts not to compete, Coyne Indus. Laundry v. Gould, 359 Mass. 269, 
268 N.E.2d 848 (1971); or that interdict rock concerts, Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 158 
Ind. App. 445, 303 N.E.2d 50 (1973); and strikes, Long Island Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. 
Trainmen, 298 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); or protecting an employee's right to minimum 
wages, Mitchell v. All States Bus. Prods. Corp., 232 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), or nuisances, 
Department of Pub. Health v. Cumberland Cattle Co., 361 Mass. 817, 282 N.E.2d 895 (1972); or 
prohibiting improper disposal of furniture, Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash. 2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 
(1964); or protecting a party's right to a specially developed flower, Ramstead v. Hauge, 73 Wash. 
2d 162, 437 P.2d 402 (1968). 
6. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 1.2 (1973) [hereinafter cited at D. 
DoBBs]. 
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rules may frustrate the substantive policies sought to be effectuated by 
the remedy. This article asserts that a pluralistic approach to compen-
satory contempt best reflects the courts' desire to promote the policies 
underlying the substantive laws, while avoiding the injustices that often 
result when a court adopts uniform rules of compensatory contempt. 
Judicial application of compensatory contempt is often in the con-
text of overlapping policies and consequences. Many antisocial acts 
possess parallel civil and criminal consequences. Courts of equity, for 
example, often enjoin crimes.7 Civil consequences, moreover, may be 
both legal and equitable. Remedies may also be cumulative. A copy-
right infringer, for example, may be convicted, enjoined and charged 
with damages.8 When a defendant violates an injunction, the plaintiff 
may choose between compensatory contempt and a separate action.9 
These procedures are so related that bringing either should be res judi-
cata to preclude maintaining the other. 10 
The remedy of compensatory contempt should possess several 
characteristics. Compensatory contempt should conform to the sub-
stantive purpose expressed by the injunction and should never be more 
burdensome to a plaintiff than a separate damage action. Unless it is as 
procedurally smooth and financially remunerative as a separate dam-
age action, compensatory contempt will fail to promote the underlying 
substantive purpose. It should advance the substantive purpose at least 
as effectively as a separate damage action. In addition to advancing the 
substantive standard, compensatory contempt should serve the decision 
to enjoin. Courts remedy most injuries with money damages. Because 
compensatory contempt is a satisfactory remedy only when an action 
for damages would be inadequate, this article will examine compensa-
tory contempt by comparing the alternate remedy of retrospective 
money damages actions. 11 
Injunctions are issued in lieu of money damages when, for moral, 
economic, or administrative reasons, courts conclude that money dam-
ages are inadequate. The judge enjoins the defendant so that the plain-
tiff may enjoy the actual substantive interest rather than a money 
7. Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity l/nder Prohibilion, 5 W1s. L. REv. 412 (1930). 
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (Supp. II 1978). 
9. In re Barney's Boats of Chicago, Inc., 616 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1980); United States Steel 
Corp. v. United Mineworkers of America, Dist. 20,598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979); Estate ofRothko, 
84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 963 (1975), ajf'd on olher grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 401 
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1975). 
10. Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 186 N.W. 787 (1922); Es-
tate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 963 (1975), affd on other grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 
305, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1975); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTS§ 61(1) (Tent. Draft. No. 
I 1973). Several contempt statutes provide that bringing compensatory contempt bars a separate 
damage action. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.1721 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 588.11 (West 
1947); N.Y. lUD. LAW§ 773 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-10-04(1) (1974); OR. REV. 
STAT.§ 33.110 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-32-11 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 7.20.100 
(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 295.14 (West 1958). 
II. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1946). 
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substitute. When the defendant violates the injunction, however, the 
judge may order compensatory contempt. 
The central irony of compensatory contempt is that the remedy 
confesses failure. The defendant violated the injunction, thus thwart-
ing the judge's conclusion that the plaintiff should enjoy the substantive 
right. This reduces the judge to a retrospective, substitutionary rem-
edy. He now must award the plaintiff the money previously considered 
inadequate. The plaintiffs remedy when the defendant violates an in-
junction, however, should represent more than the mere money dam-
ages that the judge would have awarded prior to the issuance of the 
injunction, had he not originally thought that damages were inade-
quate. The premise of the decision that money is an inadequate rem-
edy is that the plaintiff should enjoy the substantive right in fact. The 
compensatory contempt doctrine should recognize that, because the 
judge originally rejected money as a .remedy, the money award em-
ployed to remedy the violation of the injunction should take into con-
sideration the initial decision to enjoin. The injunction failed to 
prevent the violation, but compensatory contempt may encourage the 
plaintiff to respect the injunction process, ameliorate some of the plain-
tiffs damages, and structure incentives to discourage future breaches. 
This article analyzes compensatory contempt by tracing the legal 
issues associated with the remedy through the actual stages in which 
the remedy would be sought. Part II examines the commencement of 
compensatory contempt. Part III focuses on issues arising from com-
pensatory contempt hearings, including jury trials and burdens of 
proof. Part IV discusses the calCulation of compensatory contempt 
awards and Part V compares the collection of a contempt award with 
the collection of a money judgment. 
II. COMMENCING COMPENSATORY CONTEMPT 
When an aggrieved individual requests compensatory contempt, 
rather than bringing a separate and independent action, he simply 
makes a post-judgment motion. ComEensatory contempt therefore re-
mains a part of the injunction lawsuit 2 and results in several procedu-
ral ramifications. The aggrieved individual retains the right to request 
contempt only so long as his claim remains unsettled and unsatisfied. 
If the parties settle the underlying action the plaintiff loses the right to 
commence or continue compensatory contempt. 13 
12. Sumrall v. Moody, 620 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1980). But see King v. Greenblatt, 489 F. 
Supp. 105, 106 (D. Mass. 1980) (dicta). 
13. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911); Backo v. Local 281, 
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 438 F.2d 176, 182 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970); Flight Eng'rs Int'1 
Ass'n, EAL Chapter v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 301 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1962); Hendryx v. Fitzpat-
rick, 19 F. 810, 811-13 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884) (dicta); Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and 
Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 780, 809 (1943); Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, 
and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1563, 1588-89 (1975). Cf. MacNeil v. United States, 236 
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The plaintiff initiates compensatory contempt by serving the de-
fendant-contemnor with an order to show cause why contempt is not 
justified. 14 In an injunction action, the court enters an in personam 
order retaining jurisdiction to impose a contempt order, no matter 
where the conduct occurred. 15 The plaintiff need not serve process as 
he would if initiating a separate damages action. Instead, he serves 
process by mailing the documents to the contemnor or to the contem-
nor's attorney. 16 Nonetheless, the contemnor is entitled to specific in-
formation about the charges, a reasonable amount of time to prepare, 
and an opportunity to be heard. 17 
From the plaintiffs perspective, commencing compensatory con-
tempt with a motion is manifestly superior to beginning a separate 
damage action. Retaining jurisdiction is easier than obtaining jurisdic-
tion. The issues are adjudicated where the injunction proceeding took 
place and usually before the same judge. It may be difficult or impossi-
ble, on the other hand, to secure jurisdiction anew over a contemnor in 
the original court and to perfect service again upon an evasive litigant. 
A motion mailed to a contemnor or the contemnor's attorney is clearly 
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1956). But see McComb v. Jacksoriville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1949) 
(dicta) (apparently confusing coercive and compensatory contempt). Conscious settlement must 
be distinguished from other methods of ending the controversy. For example, a coun in one case 
granted an interlocutory injunction and the defendant appealed. The defendant neglected to com-
ply while the appeal was pending. The appeal was later dismissed as moot because the defendant 
had begun to comply with the injunction. The coun erroneously refused to award compensatory 
contempt to the plaintiff for the defendant's violations between the interlocutory injunction and 
the dismissal of the appeal. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 92 F. 
Supp. 352 (D. Minn. 1952). If the plaintiff suffered any damage from the defendant's violation of 
a valid interlocutory injunction, the coun should have allowed the plaintiff to recover them in the 
injunction action as compensatory contempt instead of remitting the plaintiff to a separate· action 
for damages. Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 
1970); Rivers v. Miller, 112 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1940) (recognizing the rule); Getka v. Lader, 71 
Wis. 2d 237, 238 N.W.2d 87 (1976). 
14. The order is commonly referred to as "an order to show cause." See, e.g., Leman v. 
Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 450 (1932). In Massachusetts, the document is 
called a petition for attachment for contempt. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 
1942). Compare Loland & Hayes, Contempt Proceedings: Another Dimension to Consumer Protec-
tion, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. I, 22-23 n.l58 (1980). But see King v. Greenblatt, 489 F. Supp. 105, 
106 (D. Mass. 1980). 
15. Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451 (1932); Franklin Mint 
Corp. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 360 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Lyon v. Bloomfield, 355 Mass. 
738, 247 N.E.2d 555 (1969). The plaintiff should be able to proceed against the contemnor for 
breach of an injunction in any state. All states should apply the enjoining state's law to compen-
sate the plaintiff. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); 
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW§§ 49, 74 (3d ed. 1977). Forums which do not recognize 
compensatory contempt, however, may be allowed either to decline the suit or to remit the plain-
tiff to a separate action on the ground that "full faith and credit does not automatically compel a 
forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state 
.... " Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609,611 (1951). 
16. See, e.g., Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 450-54 (1932); Aero-
vox Corp. v. Concourse Elec. Co., 90 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1937); People ex rei. Golden v. Golden, 57 
A.D.2d 807,394 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1977). Butcf. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d I, 8 (8th Cir. 1951) 
(civil contempt notice personally served). 
17. Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 158 Ind. App. 445, 303 N.E.2d 50, 56-58 (1973). 
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more expeditious and less expensive than service in hand. In a separate 
action, moreover, the pleading rules may allow delay, while a motion 
can be disposed of more promptly. 18 
In addition to these procedural problems, compensatory contempt 
raises the question of who can commence a compensatory contempt 
proceeding. When a court issues an injunction, the beneficiaries differ 
according to the circumstances. An injunction proscribing trespass 
may help only the plaintiff landowner, whereas another injunction 
prosecuted by the same landowner in a nuisance action against defend-
ant's smoky chimney may purify the air for a township. 
If any person allegedly injured by an injunction violation could 
resort to compensatory contempt, the policy of ensuring that defend-
ants obey injunctions would be furthered. This philosophy underlies 
the first half of rule 71 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "When 
an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, 
he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were 
a party." 19 
On the other hand, the adversary system, antagonisms to party au-
tonomy, and the idea of injunctions as individualized prohibitions mili-
tate against anyone but formal parties seeking contempt. Many courts 
today, moreover, interpret the "same process" language of rule 71 as 
incorporating intervention doctrines, standing rules, and issue preclu-
sion analysis, thus limiting those who can seek a contempt order. 
The traditional doctrine-limiting the class of individuals who 
may institute compensatory contempt proceedings-is the result of 
older opinions, resolving disputes in which plaintiffs sought recovery 
for violations of injunctions that protected real and personal property 
interest. Successors in interest, transferees, attorneys, receivers and 
stockholders-in short only those with a pecuniary interest in the 
breached order--could commence compensatory contempt?0 Al-
though an unrelated person could benefit, the early courts thought that 
injunctions were not equivalent to statutes or common law doctrines 
creating for anyone wronged a cause of action for compensatory con-
tempt.21 
Several developments, however, render the earlier decisions less 
relevant to modem litigation. First, courts have begun to recognize 
nonpecuniary "new property." Courts have asserted and defended in-
dividual interests in the new property, but much of this litigation has 
been conducted on behalf of sprawling, amorphous groups, with at-
18. Compare FED. R. Ctv. P. 12 with FED. R. Ctv. P. 78. 
19. FED. R. Ctv. P. 71 (emphasis added). 
20. Frey v. Willey, 161 Kan. 196, 166 P.2d 659 (1946). 
21. See, e.g., Lyon v. Bloomfield, 355 Mass. 738, 247 N.E.2d 555 (1969); In re Niklaus, 144 
Neb. 503, 13 N.W.2d 655 (1944). 
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tendant consequences for nonparties. 22 Second, the judicial trend in 
favor of intervention may facilitate increased nonparty intervention in 
injunction actions.23 Courts have allowed individuals who obviously 
benefit from judgments to pursue the fruits of a party's victory through 
contempt24 and execution.25 Courts have also allowed nonparties to 
join the suit after judgment when intervention neither prejudices ex-
isting parties nor interferes substantially with orderly process.26 
An alternative to intervention in an injunction lawsuit may often 
be the filing of a second suit with a plea of offensive collateral estoppel. 
A defendant who lost an equitable action may, in a later action for 
damages, be precluded from relitigating the factual issu~s. 27 Thus, a 
nonparty to an injunction may file a damage action against the en-
joined defendant. The damaged plaintiff may employ the equitable 
findings to establish the defendant's liability, leaving only the amount 
of the plaintiffs damages to be adjudicated in the second action. 
The recent case of Northside Realty Associates, Inc. v. United 
States 28 demonstrates the relationship between intervention for a con-
tempt order and offensive issue preclusion. In Northside Realty, the 
Fifth Circuit refused to allow citizen-nonparties to recover compensa-
tory contempt from a disobedient defendant in a statutory action 
brought by the federal government under the Fair Housing Act. Tak-
ing a narrow view of the litigation, the court suggested that nonparties 
who were injured when the defendant violated the injunction could sue 
in a separate action where the defendant would be entitled to a jury 
22. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1302 
(1976). 
23. Some courts discuss these issues in terms of standing. See, e.g., Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 877 (1965). Standing, however, launches an inquiry too amorphous, unfocused, and narrow 
to comprehend accurately the interests affected. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978). 
If rule 71 fails to provide sufficient guidance, judges should refer to the delay, party and judicial 
economy, the adversary premise, and obedience to the law. 
24. Woods v. O'Brien, 78 F. Supp. 221 (D. Mass. 1948); City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati 
Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St. 2d 197, 200-01, 299 N.E.2d 686, 690-91, 695 (1973) (special interven-
tion statute for taxpayers). Cf. Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (injunction 
protected "members of the public"). 
25. United States v. Hackett, 123 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mo. 1954). 
26. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 1916 (1969). See, 
e.g., Hodgson v. U.M.W., 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 
181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Decisions which forbid private litigants to intervene to enforce orders in 
litigation prosecuted by the government are designed more to ensure government control of gov-
ernment litigation than they are to effectuate a more general prohibition of post-judgment inter-
vention. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Shurtenda Steaks, Inc., 424 F.2d 192 (lOth Cir. 
1970); United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). With the preceding cases, the reader should contrast 
the· Ohio court's alacrity to allow a taxpayer to intervene to prosecute a contempt case against a 
municipal employee's union, after officials expressed their intent not to press contempt. City of 
Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St. 2d 197, 200-01, 299 N.E.2d 686, 690-91 
(1973). 
27. Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
28. 605 F.2d 1348, 1356-58 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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trial.29 The court failed to recognize, however, that the intervention 
doctrine offered the defendant as much protection as a separate action. 
In remitting to a separate action those individuals the government 
sought to protect, the court did not consider the effects of issue preclu-
sion. Under issue preclusion, the adjudication of issues in the first case 
would bind the defendant in the later case. 
The court also confused contempt to compensate for past harm 
with contempt to coerce future obedience, observing that a compensa-
tory award to nonparties "would have at best a tangential effect in co-
ercing future compliance with the Court's decree." 30 The 
compensatory award would be considered reimbursement for past 
damages, not an inducement for future compliance. In addition, by 
accusing the government of attempting to "transform the civil con-
tempt proceeding into a representative class action,"31 the court re-
vealed its anachronistic, bipolar view of a problem that calls for 
systematic, structural reform. If the court desired to fashion a remedy 
as broad as the wrong committed by the defendant, then all persons 
harmed should be represented by the government in the compensatory 
contempt proceedings, or the victims should be allowed to intervene in 
the injunction action.32 The proper beacons to guide courts in deter-
mining who may institute or receive compensatory contempt should be 
the sophisticated and developing doctrines of issue preclusion and in-
tervention, not concepts of standing and property law. 
Ill. HEARINGS ON COMPENSATORY CONTEMPT 
After the court grants a motion for compensatory contempt and 
issues an order to the defendant to show cause for withholding con-
tempt, the court holds a hearing to determine whether the contemnor 
violated the injunction and, if so, how much he should pay. A judge 
normally decides these issues on the basis of evidence submitted under 
oath and subjected to cross-examination in a trial hearing under rule 
43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33 Generally, the com-
plaining party must prove compensatory contempt by clear and con-
vincing evidence before a judge presiding without a jury. A separate 
action to recover money might, on the other hand, be heard by a jury 
and would be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Both the 
standard of proof and the defendant's right to a jury, however, are dis-
puted issues in the compensatory contempt area. 
29. /d. 
30. /d. at 1356. 
31. /d. at 1357. 
32. See, e.g., Cohan & Hayes, Gontempt Proceedings: Another J)imension to Consumer Pro-
tection, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. I (1980). 
33. In federal courts, the trial hearing is held under rule 43(a). Sanders v. Monsanto Co., 
574 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1978); Hoffman v. Beer Drivers Local888, 536 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1976); see 
also Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 158 Ind. App. 445,456-60,303 N.E.2d 50, 56-58 (1973). 
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The elements of compensatory contempt are violation and dam-
ages. If a plaintiff shows that the contemnor disobeyed the injunction 
the judge should grant a remedial award.34 As Judge Magruder noted 
in Parker v. United States, the "court has no discretion to withhold the 
appropriate remedial order .... An order imposing a compensatory 
fine in a civil contempt proceeding is . . . analogous to a tort judgment 
for damages caused by wrongful conduct."35 Injunctions, moreover, 
create strict liability. The contemnor's mental state is not an issue. In 
fact, the Supreme Court has noted that the "absence of willfulness does 
not relieve [one] from civil contempt. ... [The order placed on con-
temners] a duty to obey specified provisions of the statute. An act does 
not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it 
may have been done innocently."36 The defendant's duty under an in-
junction, however, is unlike a tort duty owed by everyone to the world 
at large. The injunction proceeding personalizes the defendant's legal 
duty. Courts have held defendants to a standard of care greater than 
that imposed in tort cases and have placed an affirmative obligation 
upon defendants to comply with the court order. Poverty or inadver-
tence are not defenses37 and corporations are responsible when an em-
ployee disobeys an injunction, even though top management is not 
aware of the employee's conduct and may even have forbidden his ac-
tions.38 In fact, courts have warned defendants to observe carefully the 
fine line between compliance with an order and violation.39 Those in-
dividuals enjoined "must do more than see how close they can come 
with safety to that which they were enjoined from doing."40 
34. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1922); Parker v. United States, !53 F.2d 
66, 70 (1st Cir. 1942); National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kueker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979); but if. United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay's Stores, Inc., 278 N.E.2d 716, 718 n.3 (Mass. 
1972) (view expressed in Parker perhaps too inflexible). See also Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunc-
tions, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 780, 793-96 (1943) (noting an exception for family support obligations). 
35. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); see also Thompson v. Johnson, 
410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
36. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949). See also, e.g., West Tex. 
Uti!. Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 206 F.2d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 
855 (1953); Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St. 2d 7, 271 N.E.2d 815 (1971) (good faith 
and advice of counsel not defenses); Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash. 2d 929, 934, 395 P.2d 183, 
186 (1964) (willfulness unnecessary). But see Sander v. Morton, 518 F.2d 1084, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
37. National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kueker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mont. 1957). 
38. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(arguably independent contractors); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Vacuum Stores, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 
738, 741 (D.N.J. 1961); United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay's Stores, Inc., 361 Mass. 35, 278 N.E.2d 
716 (1972); Cohan & Hayes, Contempt Proceedings: Another Dimension to Consumer Protection, 
14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. I, 11-12 (1980). See also In re Barnard, 48 N.J. Eq. 105, 21 A. 182 (1891). 
39. World's Finest Chocolate, Inc. v. World Candies, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 840, 844 (N.D. Ill. 
1976). 
40. Esskay Drugs, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 188 F.2d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 
1951); National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kueker, 481 F. Supp. 612,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); but if. 
United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay's Stores, Inc., 361 Mass. 35, 278 N.E.2d 716, 717 (1972) ("clear 
and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal command"). 
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A. Burden of Proof: Preponderance or Clear and Convincing? 
Courts disagree on the quantum of evidence required to prove the 
defendant's violation of the injunction and to establish the plaintiff's 
right to compensation. Of the two standards generally applied, clear 
and convincing proof is more exacting than the preponderance burden 
normally imposed in civil trials. Under the preponderance standard, 
the factfinder finds for the proponent when satisfied more probably 
than not that the evidence is in his favor. The factfinder seeking clear 
and convincing proof, however, finds for the proponent only when his 
contention is highly probable. The special clear and convincing stan-
dard originated in equity, although it has modern application in jury 
trials involving fraud, undue influence, reformation, and recission. 
Courts also appear to apply the clear and convincing standard to claims 
they disfavor on policy grounds, or when they fear that witnesses will 
lie.4I 
Courts have generally failed to articulate a rationale for requiring 
clear and convincing proof in compensatory contempt. Courts and 
other authorities who apply the more burdensome standard to compen-
satory contempt proceedings generally view compensatory contempt 
simply as civil contempt and cite as authority contempt decisions ap-
plying the more stringent standards of proof.42 By failing to differenti-
ate coercive from compensatory contempt, however, these decisions do 
not take into account the peculiar aspects of compensatory contempt 
that would justify application of a different standard to compensatory 
contempt. 
This reasoning and the clear and convincing standard in compen-
satory contempt are impossible to accept. Courts should tell plaintiffs 
to prove the contemnor's violation and their damages by a simple pre-
ponderance of the evidence.43 An enhanced burden makes some sense 
where the judge may imprison the contemnor to coerce, but this does 
not apply to compensatory contempt where the plaintiff only asks the 
judge to grant money. Compensatory contempt shifts the benefit of an-
tisocial conduct from a wrongdoer to the one harmed. Unlike a prison 
sentence, the compensatory contempt extracted from the contemnor 
provides a benefit to the plaintiff. The clear and convincing standard is 
employed when courts are attempting to avoid erroneously imposing 
41. Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1976). 
42. See, e.g., Northside Realty Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1352 (5th Cir. 
1980); Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 533 F.2d 344,351 (7th Cir. 1976); 
National Labor Relations Bd. v. San Francisco Typographical Union, 465 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 
1972); Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. Rev. 780, 818-19 
(1943). But see State ex rei. Seattle Bottlers Ass'n v. Flora Co., 169 Wash. 120, 13 P.2d 467 (1932) 
(preponderance standard in compensatory contempt). See also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, II FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 2960, at 205-06 n.99 (1973) (wherein the courts are said to apply 
clear and convincing standard in all civil contempt proceedings). 
43. State ex rei. Seattle Bottlers Ass'n v. Flora Co., 169 Wash. 120, 13 P.2d 467 (1932). 
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compensatory contempt more than they are attempting to avoid exon-
erating contemners. This contrasts with the preponderance standard 
that courts generally apply in a civil adjudication for money. The pre-
ponderance standard assumes that erroneous imposition of damages 
and exoneration of wrongdoing similarly dilute the legal rule's deter-
rent effect. Thus, the standard weighs them equally.44 Judicial appli-
cation of compensatory contempt should be governed by the ordinary 
preponderance standard. 
The clear and convincing evidence standard makes even less sense 
when the plaintiff may choose between compensatory contempt and a 
separate damage action with a preponderance standard. The clear and 
convincing burden discourages plaintiffs from seeking compensatory 
contempt, encouraging them to file separate damage actions and 
thereby promotes inefficient use of judicial resources. The plaintiffs 
burden in compensatory contempt should never exceed his burden in a 
separate action for damages. Unless the burden of proof in a separate 
action is clear and convincing, the compensatory contempt burden 
should be a preponderance of the evidence.45 
Clear and convincing evidence in compensatory contempt actions 
is also inconsistent with the prerequisite that money damages represent 
an inadequate remedy. The judge must make such a determination 
prior to the issuance of an injunction. When the defendant disobeys 
the injunction, the judge awards the plaintiff the money previously con-
sidered to be inadequate. Consequently, the judge should refuse to im-
pose a higher hurdle of proof in compensatory contempt than the 
plaintiff would have encountered suing the defendant separately for the 
inadequate money remedy. In proving the inadequacy of damages, 
moreover, the plaintiff already met an effectively more stringent stan-
dard of proof than the mere preponderance test. 
These three rationales-the consideration of money damages as 
inadequate, the desire to-use judicial resources efficiently, and the need 
in civil damage actions to weigh exoneration and the erroneous imposi-
tion of damages equally-present a strong argument for applying the 
preponderance standard in compensatory contempt proceedings. Be-
cause of the peculiar aspects of the monetary compensation, moreover, 
these three arguments also justify application of the lesser standard to 
compensatory contempt actions, even though the jurisdiction may ap-
ply the clear and convincing standard in coercive contempt proceed-
ings. 
44. R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 21.3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER). 
45. Bur see Special Committee of the Junior Barristers of the Los Angeles Bar Association, 
Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 174 (1954) (in which it is stated 
that the plaintiff must establish the acts complained of by clear and convincing evidence in a civil 
contempt proceeding in federal court). 
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B. Factjinders: Judge or Jury? 
In addition to the controversy over standard of proof, questions 
also arise around whether to use a jury to hear claims for compensation 
in a compensatory contempt proceeding. The problem results from the 
historical phenomenon of the dual court system: a law judge with a 
jury granting damages, and an equity chancellor across the hall issuing 
injunctions. Today, although those courts are merged, a major differ-
ence persists. Judges try injunction actions without juries but empanel 
juries to hear money claims. Deciding where to try actions for breach 
of injunctions in which money damages are sought is like the hypothet-
ical railroad ticket agent's dilemma: whether to put a centaur in the 
train's livestock or passenger car. 
The historical dichotomy presents three options. The first, already 
dismissed, suggests that the plaintiff file a separate action for damages. 
The other two are variations on the normal pattern of juryless injunc-
tion and contempt proceedings. Both variations retain compensatory 
contempt as part of the injunction action. One, however, provides for 
the empaneling of a jury for determination of damages. The other va-
riation allows the judge to rule on damages. 
The federal courts and a majority of states maintain compensatory 
contempt without a jury.46 Several states and the United States have 
statutes that authorize or are read to authorize compensatory damages 
in contempt.47 These courts apparently reason that contempt remains 
part of the original injunction action. And because equity should pro-
vide full relief, power to grant compensatory relief is inherent in the 
power to enjoin. Further, the nonjury aspect of enjoinment carries over 
to compensatory contempt.48 
Other courts reject compensatory contempt.49 California remits 
46. United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S. 258, 298 (1947); Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge 
Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932). In the state courts, recent holdings with clear statements on the law 
in this area are difficult to find. Older, technical opinions abound and inconsistent holdings 
within states exist. Recent decisions include, e.g., Mitchell v. All States Business Prods. Corp., 232 
F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1956); Jones 
v. Wright, 35 Md. App. 313, 370 A.2d 1144 (1977); see also Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 895 (1978). 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-863(C) (Supp. 1957-1979); KAN. STAT. 
§ 60-909 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.1721 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 588.11 (1947); 
N.Y. JuD. LAW.§ 773 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-10..04(1) (1974); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN.§ 2727.12 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1390 (West Supp. 1979-80); 
OR. REV. STAT.§ 33.110 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 23-904-905 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-32-11 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 7.20.100 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 295.14 (West 
1958). Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 895 (1978) lists the following jurisdictions as having decisions reflect-
ing these statutes: United States, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
48. Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 361-63, 157 N.E. 684, 690..91 (1927); Barber v. 
George R. Jones Shoe Co., 80 N.H. 507, 120 A. 80 (1923); Stimpson v. Putnam, 41 Vt. 238 (1867); 
Moskovitz, Contempt o/ Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 780, 805 (1943). 
49. Round Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Basic Elecs. Mfg. Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 40, 376 N.E.2d 436 
(1978); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Coun, 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954); Edrington v. Pridham, 
65 Tex. 612 (1886); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 3d 895 (1978) (The Annotation also lists Alabama, Arkan-
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the plaintiff aggreived by the breach of an injunction to an ordinary 
civil action.50 Alabama allows plaintiffs to recover compensation in an 
ancillary proceeding in the injunction action where either party may be 
entitled to a jury trial.51 Oklahoma's constitution requires a jury in 
civil compensatory contempt.52 
A major premise of the decisions refusing to permit the remedy of 
compensatory contempt appears to be that actions to recover money 
are heard before juries instead of in the juryless chancellory.53 These 
courts hold that they lack statutory or precedential authority to sanc-
tion compensatory relief in civil contempt proceedings. 54 Statutes that 
provide for fines or imprisonment limit the courts to punishment and 
exclude other remedies. 55 The courts also reason that the statutory 
word "fine" cannot be expanded to include compensation, because it 
means a penalty paid to the public, not to the plaintiff.56 Under this 
rejectionist rationale, contempt penalizes the contemnor and vindicates 
the court's authority; it does not provide a remedy for a private liti-
gant.57 In these jurisdictions, courts may employ civil contempt to en-
force the injunction, apparently by coercion, but not to grant 
damages.58 The aggrieved beneficiary of an injunction may, however, 
sas, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, and North Carolina in this group. Federal courts in 
diversity actions follow federal practice in awarding compensatory contempt, although clear hold-
ings are difficult to find.) See Folk v. Wallace Business Forms, Inc., 394 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1968) 
(North Carolina); Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(rejecting New York contempt statute); Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 
1939) ("New York cases cannot be controlling upon the federal courts whose power to punish for 
contempt is limited by a federal statute."); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945) 
("State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court must give simply because a federal 
court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal .... Contrariwise, a federal 
court may afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a State even though a 
State court cannot give it."). 
50. H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954). 
51. Moody v. State ex rei. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116 (Ala. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 
(1978). 
52. Ex parte Stephenson, 89 Okla. Crim. 427,209 P.2d 515 (1949); Clark v. Most Worshipful 
St. John's Grand Lodge, 198 Okla. 621, 624-25, 181 P.2d 229, 233 (1947). 
53. See generally Note, Procedures for Trying Contempts in the Federal Courts, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 353, 355 (1959). 
54. See, e.g., Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage & Fin. Co., 294 Ala. 281, 315 So. 2d 431 
(1975); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954); Levan v. Third Dist. 
Court, 4 Idaho 667, 43 P. 574 (1896). 
55. Ragsdale v. Bryan, 235 Ga. 58, 218 S.E.2d 809 (1975); United Artists Records, Inc. v. 
Eastern Tape Corp., 18 N.C. App. 183, 196 S.E.2d 598, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 666, 197 S.E.2d 880 
(1973); State ex rei. Flynn v. Fifth Judicial Circuit, 24 Mont. 33, 60 P. 493 (1900). 
56. Rothschild & Co. v. Steger & Sons Piano Mfg. Co., 256 Ill. 196,99 N.E. 920 (1912); State 
ex rei. Flynn v. Fifth Judicial Circuit, 24 Mont. 33, 60 P. 493 (1900); In re Rhodes, 65 N.C. 518 
(1871). 
57. See, e.g.: H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954); Eberle v. 
Greene, 71 Ill. App. 2d 85, 217 N.E.2d 6 (1966); Dunlavey v. Doggett, 38 Mont. 204, 99 P. 436 
(1909). 
58. Eberle v. Greene, 71 Ill. App. 2d 85, 217 N.E.2d 6 (1966); Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 
732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963); Hallam v. Alpha Coal Corp., 122 W.Va. 454, 9 S.E.2d 818 (1940). 
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recover money either in a separate jury action59 or in a ancillary pro-
ceeding in the injunction suit where either party may summon a jury.60 
The argument that actions for damages must always be heard by a 
jury misunderstands the inadequacy prerequisite and the jury's role. 
As previously noted, a judge must determine that money damages are 
an inadequate remedy before issuing an injunction. Consequently, 
compensatory contempt cannot be viewed as the equivalent of a sepa-
rate damage action.61 Before enjoining the defendant, the judge re-
jected money and proceeded without a jury to prevent the defendant 
from impinging upon the plaintiffs right. Now it is too late to prevent 
harm. Having excluded a jury from the decision to enjoin to protect 
the ri~ht, the judge should satisfy violation of the injunction without a 
jury.62 
Observers assert that a jury's common sense keeps "the adminis-
tration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the commu-
nity."63 The judicial or legislative decision to protect a substantive 
right with injunctions is, however, a generalized decision that the right 
is too important to submit to possible jury tampering or compromise. 
A jury in a compensatory contempt proceeding following violation of 
an injunction simply delays possible jury tampering from the injunc-
tion to the damage stage. Courts should adhere to the decision to ex-
clude the jury in protecting the plaintiffs right, even when redressing 
breaches of the injunction. Perceiving juryless compensatory contempt 
as a function of the inadequacy prerequisite answers several of the ar-
guments for a separate action. 
The notion that contempt is only punitive or coercive ignores the 
fact that the judge must advance the plaintiffs substantive interest 
when the injunction itself has failed. Even without a statute authoriz-
ing compensatory damages in contempt, courts possess the power to 
grant damages for violations of legal duties, to decide whether damages 
are inadequate, and to enjoin. As part of that power, moreover, courts 
should possess the ability to restore the plaintiff to the position occu-
pied prior to the defendant's failure to comply with the injunction at 
59. See, e.g., Round Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Basic Elec. Mfg. Corp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 40, 376 
N.E.2d 436 (1978); Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 741, 119 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1963). 
60. Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage & Fin. Co., 294 Ala. 281, 315 So. 2d 4431 (1975). But 
cf. Elliott v. Burton, 19 N.C. App. 291, 198 S.E.2d 489 (1973) (second action may be barred). 
61. But cf. 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 54 (1978). 
62. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court-A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. Rev. 183, 278 (1971). The 
law in two states with juries in injunction actions, Texas and North Carolina, is consistent with 
this choice in compensatory contempt proceedings; they remit plaintiffs to separate jury actions to 
sue defendants for violations of injunctions. United Artists Records, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 
18 N.C. App. 183, 196 S.E.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 283 N.C. 666, 197 S.E.2d 880 (1973); Ed-
rington v. Pridham, 65 Tex. 612 (1886). If juries are to participate in compensatory contempt, an 
ancillary proceeding in the injunction action is more economical and quicker than a separate 
action. See Moody v. State ex rei. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116 (Ala.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). 
63. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 238 (1920). 
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least to the extent possible by monetary remuneration.64 The Supreme 
Court has ruled that the "power to impose a fine is properly treated as 
ancillary to the federal court's power to impose injunctive relief. . . . 
[t]he line between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid 
that it defeats the effective enforcement of prospective relief."65 Com-
pensatory contempt remains part of the injunction action and should 
retain injunctive attributes while furthering the substantive interest. 
The use of juries in compensatory contempt proceedings and sepa-
rate actions for damages for injunction violations appears to be a pro-
cedural anachronism remaining from the time of dual courts--one with 
power to enjoin, another with power to grant damages. Both proce-
dures raise two variations on the basic issue in contempt procedure: 
must the legislature pass a specific statute before courts may adjudicate 
a form of contempt? Should a judge share decisionmaking power with 
a jury? In this instance, "no" is the proper answer to both questions. 
Under modem conceptions that law and equity are merged, the judge 
should accord in one action the remedy the situation merits.66 If com-
mon law or legislation has armed courts to determine whether damages 
are inadequate, the decision to exclude the jury and enjoin should carry 
through from the adjudicatory stage to the enforcement process. The 
court, in short, should respect the right of a private litigant to obtain 
compliance or a substitute; it should reject procedures that inhibit legit-
imate assertions of substantive rights. 
IV. MEASURING COMPENSATORY CONTEMPT 
Although this article has articulated a standard of proof, and has 
determined who should decide when to apply compensatory contempt, 
a major issue remains: How is compensatory contempt measured? A 
basic irony brazenly confronts the judge: before enjoining, the judge 
concluded that money was not equivalent to the threatened right and 
that damages were inadequate; yet after the defendant breaches the in-
junction, the judge must mete out a substitute remedy that reflects the 
principle that the plaintiff should enjoy the substantive right. The 
judge must shape a money remedy to foster both the policy underlying 
the decision to enjoin and the substantive purpose of the cause of ac-
tion that justified the injunction's issuance. Courts should first serve 
the goals of the underlying cause of action by measuring the compensa-
tory contempt award the same way a judge would measure injury in a 
separate damage action. Although this may incidentally reflect the de-
cision to enjoin, those policies are best furthered in the secondary and 
64. Labor Relations Comm'n v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 374 Mass. 79, _ 371 
N.E.2d 761, 770 (1977). 
65. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691, 690 (1978) (compensatory award from public funds is 
prospective, injunctive, and constitutional, rather than retroactive and unconstitutional monetary 
relief). 
66. Jones v. Wright, 35 Md. App. 313, 320, 370 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1977). 
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discrete part of the remedial calculation. Courts should augment com-
pensatory contempt awards by charging the contemnor with the plain-
tiff's costs in defending and enforcing the injunction, including the 
litigation costs and attorney's fees. As determined in the decision to 
enjoin, a damage award itself is inadequate. Thus, to advance the in-
adequacy prerequisite underlying the injunction, courts should con-
sciously place the cost to enforce on the contemnor. 
A. Vindicating the Underlying Cause of Action 
1. Formulating the Award 
Courts usually measure the amount of the compensatory contempt 
award by the plaintiff's "actuallosses."67 Actual loss is generally used 
for either of two definitions, both of which are inapposite for a compen-
satory contempt award. First, "actual loss" may mean that courts 
measure damages only by a plaintiff's loss, rejecting the contemnor's 
gain. Courts should develop a less uniform, but more precise, criterion 
than actual loss. Compensatory contempt damages should be deter-
mined by the applicable substantive law's standard of remedial dam-
ages, even if that means including the contemnor's gain. 
"Actual loss" may also mean that the plaintiff cannot recover any 
punitive damages.68 If the underlying cause of action on which the in-
junction is based allows punitive damages in a separate action, and if 
the contemnor's misconduct otherwise merits punitive damages, then 
judges should grant punitiye damages. For the price of an awkward 
contradiction in terms, punitive damages in compensatory contempt 
proceedings will promote the substantive standard, reflect the inade-
quacy prerequisite, and replace some of the work accomplished by im-
posing criminal contempt fines. 
Compensatory contempt performs many useful functions. If the 
judge enjoined the defendant because he was judgment-proof, but can 
now pay, compensatory contempt suffices. Second, if it costs the de-
fendant less to comply than the plaintiff's actual damages, compensa-
tory contempt discourages disobedience. And when the plaintiff's 
actual losses are at least equal to the defendant's gains, compensatory 
contempt will deter non-compliance. 69 Further, an order to show cause 
why compensatory contempt should not be issued often awakens a 
somnolent sense of urgency. Until the order is received, defendants 
may fail to take prompt and energetic steps to communicate injunctions 
67. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,447 (1911); Allied Materi-
als Corp. v. Superior Prods. Co., 620 F.2d 224, 227 (lOth Cir. 1980); Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 
939, 944 (9th Cir. 1956); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1946); Chemical Fire-
proofing Corp. v. Bronska, 553 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Mo. App. 1973). See generally Moskovitz, Con-
tempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 780, 806-08 (1943). 
68. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 278 (1971). 
69. Note, Injunction Negotiations: Economic, Moral and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 
1563, 1592-93 (1975) (using the terms "deterrent" and "compensation levels"). 
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to subordinates and to begin to comply.70 The substantive purpose of 
the cause of action underlying the injunction, however, can be fur-
thered if the contempt court would measure the award in the same 
manner as a damage court. 
Legislatures have produced a noteworthy model in presenting ex-
clusive proprietary rights enforceable by injunction. In the patent, 
trademark, and copyright areas, for example, policymakers created ex-
clusive rights in statutory monopolies to subsidize innovation. Proprie-
tors often exchange their exclusive rights for valuable consideration.71 
The proprietor takes the licensee's money in exchange for the exclusive 
right. The right to exercise the monopoly flows to the licensee who 
values it more highly than the money the proprietor receives. Bar-
gained transactions allocate resources efficiently. The competitive pro-
cess assesses the proprietor's innovation and allows the licensee, who 
should be able to exploit the innovation efficiently, to exercise the mo-
nopoly. 
Sound remedial policy seeks rules to encourage people to bargain 
voluntarily instead of resorting to coercive judicial transactions, which 
are expensive and potentially inaccurate.72 A damage theory based on 
the proprietor's loss may not encourage others to bargain voluntarily 
with proprietors. An efficient and businesslike but unscrupulous in-
fringer may gain more from infringing on the plaintiffs rights than an 
inefficient proprietor may lose; this callous infringer may be willing to 
infringe now and pay later, and let a judge set the price instead of nego-
tiating with the proprietor. To destroy this sort of profit incentive, 
many remedial systems apportion damages by the wrongdoer's gain. 
To advance the purpose of the substantive rules, the compensatory con-
tempt court should follow a damage theory based on the contemnor's 
profit if a court could grant such an award in a damage action.73 
This model has several advantages. It encourages potential in-
fringers to bargain privately with proprietors. If the infringer is en-
joined and then violates the injunction, measurement by the 
contemnor's gain avoids the burden and expense of a separate damage 
action, enforces the substantive standard of the underlying cause of ac-
tion, and lets the contempt court rely on well-developed bodies of re-
70. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973); Babee-Tenda Corp. v. 
Scharco Mfg. Co., 156 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
71. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 
76 YALE L.J. 267,275-79 (1966). 
72. See R. PosNER, supra note 44, §§ 7.2, 19.1. 
73. Broadview Chern. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447, 449 (D. Conn. 1970) (in 
dealing with violations of an injunction forbidding patent infringement, court "not bound" by 
patent damage statute. But "since that statute relates to the subject matter underlying the con-
tempt and both parties refer the court to it, it is not inappropriate to utilize it to measure the 
damages .... ");Nova Indus. Corp. v. Nissen, 30 Wise. 2d 123, 130-31, 140 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 
( 1966) (injunction based on contract). See also Northside Realty Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 605 
F.2d 1348, 1355-56 (5th Cir. 1979); National Research Bureau v. Kueker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615-16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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medial doctrine. If the contemnor violated an injunction forbidding 
interference with the plaintiffs land, the judge should follow other 
courts and measure damage by an appropriate theory such as rental 
value74 or diminished value.75 Similarly, the plaintiff should recover 
for lost good will or reputation when the contemnor breaches an in-
junction that protects the plaintiffs trademark and prevents unfair 
competition.76 If the damage action's remedial structure measures 
damages by the defendant's gain, then a judge should apportion com-
pensatory contempt in that manner.77 This may compel the contemnor 
to account to the plaintiff for profits. 78 "Actual loss" as a separate crite-
rion for compensatory contempt should be restricted to contempt with-
out analogous money measures. 79 
Courts generally base money damage for breach of contract on the 
profit lost by the nonbreaching party. They do not intend to prevent all 
breaches of contract. When gain from breach exceeds cost, a maximiz-
ing party is encouraged to abort a contract and pay the other party's 
lost profit.80 Lost profit to the nonbreaching party is efficient because 
no one suffers, some improve their positions, and resources move to-
ward more optimal uses.81 In deciding to enjoin or to order specific 
performance of a contract, the court concludes that damages are unsat-
isfactory and rejects money as a remedy. While damage theory encour-
ages efficient breach of contracts, efficient violation of injunctions 
frustrates the policies of both the inadequacy prerequisite and the deci-
sion to compel specific performance. Substantive contract remedies 
based on lost profit are inadequate when the judge concluded earlier 
that the defendant should perform. When measuring by the victim's 
loss fails to limit antisocial conduct, society should impose additional 
costs on wrongdoers. 82 Basing compensation on the plaintiffs objective 
74. Lyon v. Bloomfield, 355 Mass 738,247 N.E.2d 555 (1969). D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 5.3, 
at 333, § 5.8, at 365. 
75. Chadwick v. Alleshouse, 250 Ind. 348, 233 N.E.2d 162 (1968). 
76. AMF Inc. v. International Fiberglass Co., 469 F.2d 1063 (1st Cir. 1972); D. DOBBS, supra 
note 6, § 6.5, at 480. 
77. Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 457 (1932). 
78. See, e.g., W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1970) (trade-
mark injunction breached); Textay Co. v. Hayslip, 192 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1951); National Re-
search Bureau, Inc. v. Kueker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); D. DoBBS, supra note 6, 
§ 6.5, at 480 (1973). See also Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. King Aluminum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 649, 654 
(S.D. Ohio 1974) (patent injunction infringed). For the muddled state of allowing profits in patent 
infringement, see D. DoBBS, supra note 6, § 6.2 at 441-42. But see Davidson v. Munsey, 29 Utah 
181, 187-90, 80 P. 743, 744-45 (1905). But cf. Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 
F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1958); National Drying Mach. Co. v. Ackotf, 245 F.2d 192, 193 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832 (1957) (questioning unjust enrichment measure in compensatory con-
tempt). World's Finest Chocolate, Inc. v. World Candies, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 840, 846 (N.D. Ill. 
1976) (trademark consent judgment violated). 
79. Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage & Fin., 294 Ala. 281, 287-88, 315 So. 2d 431 (1975); 
Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 780, 824 (1943). 
80. R. POSNER, supra note 44, § 4.9 (1977). 
81. /d. §§ 4.9, 6.12, 19.1. Posner refers to such a breach as an "efficient breach." 
82. /d.§ 7.1. 
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losses impedes fulfillment of the goal of the adequacy prerequisite. In 
addition, it may not be feasible to ascertain the plaintiffs loss. The 
judge may have issued the injunction initially because the plaintiffs 
interest was too expensive to determine or too subjective to valuate in 
money. Hence, granting damages creates a substantial risk that the 
plaintiff will be undercompensated. 83 The judge should prevent the 
reimposition of this risk of imprecise compensation by forbidding the 
defendant from expeditiously disobeying the injunction and preventing 
the defendant from enjoying the right. 
Under the foregoing "actual loss" formula, the defendant's breach 
of an injunction converts the plaintiffs right to enjoin into an inferior 
action for damages. As an alternative, authorizing the plaintiff to re-
cover the contemnor's gain as compensatory contempt may obviate 
some of the risk of undercompensation inherent under the actual loss 
theory. Inclusion of the contemnor's gain in the formula also elimi-
nates potential profit from breach, increases the chance that the defend-
ant will either comply or negotiate with the plaintiff, and reflects the 
original decision to enjoin. 84 But it would be futile to argue that the 
contemnor's objective gain equals the plaintiffs subjective loss, and 
while measurement by his gain may reflect the policies of the inade-
quacy prerequisite, it falls short of fully vindicating those policies. 
Those policies are fully vindicated only upon total compliance with the 
injunction; thus any proposal for damages can represent no more than 
a "second-best" solution. 
2. Special Damage Provisions: Multiple, Minimum, and Punitive 
Damages 
Whereas the policies underlying the inadequacy prerequisite may 
not be fully vindicated in the compensatory contempt award, it can 
nonetheless vindicate more effectively the substantive purpose of the 
underlying cause of action. Adopting the remedial structure of the un-
derlying cause of action incorporates the substantive purposes of that 
area of the law into the injunction action and compensatory contempt 
award. Full vindication of the underlying substantive purposes, how-
ever, requires adoption of the total remedial structure. This structure 
must include special damage provisions, even if the provisions are an 
anathema to the ideal of "compensation." The special damage provi-
sions commonly provide for an automatic multiplication of damages, a 
minimal level of damages, and punitive damages. 
a. Multiplication of Damages 
In those remedial structures allowing plaintiffs to recover multiples 
83. This paragraph is based on Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral and Legal 
Analysis, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1563, 1592-93 (1975). 
84. Compare Kronman, Spec!ftc Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 378-82 (1978). 
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of damages, such as in waste, 85 patent, 86 timber trespass, 87 and anti-
trust88 cases, policymakers anticipate that potential wrongdoers dis-
count damages by the chance of enforcement. The threat of multiple 
damages lowers the potential violators' incentives to violate the law. 
Multiple damages, consequently, are designed to do more than merely 
compensate the victim for his loss. In addition, multiplication of dam-
ages encourages victims to sue, penalizes bad faith or intentional mis-
creants, and recognizes both that actual damages may be difficult to 
prove and that wrongdoers may conceal their deeds and elude appre-
hension. 
If courts in compensatory contempt proceedings adopt the damage 
theory from the underlying substantive law being enforced, a judge 
should multiply damages when the contemnor disobeys an injunction. 
The skeptic may argue that multiplication of damages in compensatory 
contempt is unnecessary. He may assume that a plaintiff will police an 
injunction more carefully than a would-be violator would honor rights 
subject to multiple damages but unprotected by an injunction. If the 
multiple standard is available in a damage action, however, it should 
be extended to a compensatory contempt plaintiff on the same terms. 89 
Multiplication of damages promotes the substantive standard upon 
which the injunction is based and vindicates the principles that man-
date the substantive remedy in compensatory contempt. 
Multiple damages in compensatory contempt also advance the in-
adequacy prerequisite. Multiple damages may be granted because ac-
tual damages are hard to prove. This practice resembles the issuance of 
an injunction to protect legally recognizable but subjective impairment 
of rights. Multiple damages in compensatory contempt actions en-
courage the defendant to either obey the legal standard or negotiate 
privately. In this sense, multiplication also furthers the inadequacy 
prerequisite and allows the plaintiff to enjoy the right in question.90 
85. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 561.17 (West 1974). D. DOBBS, mpra note 6, § 5.1, at 319 
n.65. 
86. 35 u.s.c. § 284 (1976). 
87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-560 (West Supp. 1980). D. DOBBS,mpra note 6, 
§ 5.2, at 324 n.22. 
88. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
89. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Proctor Elec. Co., 242 F. Supp. 28, 39 (D. Md. 1965); 
Baltz v. Walgreen Co., 198 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (W.D. Tenn. 1961); Carter Prods. v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 164 F. Supp. 503, 509 (D. Md. 1958). But see Broadview Chern. Corp. v. Loctite 
Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447, 453-54 (D. Conn. 1970) (wherein the court refused to multiply for several 
reasons: multiplied damages may be punitive, contemnor violated a consent decree not an injunc-
tion, plaintiff could have brought a separate action, compensatory contempt measures govern in-
stead of the patent statute, and full discovery allowed the plaintiff to be compensated fully). 
90. One court doubled damages after the contemnor breached an injunction forbidding pat-
ent infringement. The court held that the patent statute did not control but that the "inherent 
discretion possessed by a court to correct willful violations of its solemnly passed orders" did 
govern. Dow Chern. Co. v. Chemical Cleaning, Inc., 434 F.2d 1212, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970). See also 
Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86, 93, 300 A.2d 531, 535 (1973) (cash bond forfeited to plaintiff in part 
to punish contemnor for violating court order). Multiplying compensatory contempt when the 
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b. Minimum JJamages 
Statutory minimum damages perform a somewhat different func-
tion than multiplied damages. The Copyright Act, for example, autho-
rizes plaintiffs to recover the proprietor's loss or the infringer's gain. In 
addition, a plaintiff may decline to prove damage or profit and instead 
elect statutory damages, generally between $250 and $10,000.91 This 
floor recovery strengthens the substantive standard by discouraging 
small infringements, each of which causes only :minute damage individ-
ually, but great damage cumulatively. The minimum damage amount, 
moreover, creates an incentive to sue, inspiring copyright proprietors to 
protect their exclusive rights. For these reasons, a court employing 
compensatory contempt to enforce an injunction against copyright in-
fringement should let the proprietor elect statutory damages. The stat-
utory contempt minimum promotes the substantive purpose and also 
supports the inadequacy prerequisite with a margin of money for the 
impalpable interest that led policymakers to decide that damages were 
inadequate in the first place.92 
New York's compensatory contempt statute authorizes a recovery 
of $250 for plaintiffs who fail to show a compensable "actual loss or 
injury."93 New York's floor may be either a punitive fine paid to the 
plaintiff, a bounty to encourage plaintiffs to enforce injunctions, an esti-
mate of the noncompensable impairment that led to the injunction, a 
statutorily-triggered coercive fine, or a sword of Damocles hanging 
over defendant's head to deter violation. The New York Court of Ap-
peals, however, interpreted it as a minimum compensatory recovery, 
not as a punitive or exemplary measure.94 The mandated minimum 
recovery promotes the substantive standard by encouraging plaintiffs to 
enforce injunctions. The legislature may have also estimated a lower 
limit on uncompensable subjective impairment, and the minimum suin 
may thus reflect the inadequacy prerequisite. Because the minimum 
sum has not been adjusted for inflation in this century, however, $250 
substantive standard and the facts allow is the correct procedure to follow. But the judge should 
multiply damages to vindicate the substantive standard and reflect the inadequacy prerequisite, 
rather than to punish. Although punitive damages have a place in compensatory contempt, the 
judge should grant punitive damages separately and consciously. 
91. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (Supp. II 1978). See also U.C.C. §§ 9.404(1)-507(1). 
92. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 
1242, 1284 (1979); compare Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L.J. 
531, 666-67 (1975) (suggests minimum damage schedule for violations of constitution); Note, 
Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. 
REv. 966, 988-90 (1980) (same). 
93. N.Y. Juo. LAw§ 773 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. Northern 
REO Co., 259 N.W. 95, 97 (N.D. 1935). . 
94. Socialistic Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Kuhn, 164 N.Y. 473, 58 N.E. 649 (1900). But see Vail v. 
Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ($250 compensatory fine against indigent judg-
ment debtor for failing to appear at debtor's exam is "punitive"), rev'd sub nom. Judice v. Vail, 430 
u.s. 327 (1977). 
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seems more nominal than compensatory.95 Nominal damages in a 
compensatory contempt action would appear to confess judicial impo-
tence to remedy the injunction's violation.96 A minimum statutory 
award for compensatory contempt is wise, but $250 is too minimal to 
be meaningful. 
Under the model proposed in this article, compensatory contempt 
is not limited to the plaintiffs "actual loss." Measurement by the con-
temnor's gain, the multiplication of actual damages, and statutory min-
imum awards may all advance the substantive standard that the 
contemnor breached. Each may also reflect the inadequacy prerequi-
site. Punitive damages, however, raise more complicated problems. 
c. Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are granted to create an incentive to pursue 
wrongdoers, to deter violations of legal standards, to punish wrongdo-
ers, and to set an example to the public.97 A decision not to include 
punitive damages in a compensatory contempt award grows out of the 
standard formulation: compensatory contempt repays the plaintiff for 
actual losses caused by the contemnor's breach. The difference be-
tween a criminal contempt fine and a compensatory contempt award is 
that in the former the plaintiffs loss sets the bounds of the compensa-
tory contempt award. If punishment is in order, judges should prevent 
windfalls to plaintiffs by employing criminal contempt.98 
A decision to include punitive damages, however, is both more 
complex and more persuasive. Courts should reject categorical ap-
proaches that treat compensatory contempt as a hermetically sealed 
category. One commentator has demonstrated the futility of asserting 
that punitive damages are available under one legal theory but not 
under another.99 Recovery of punitive damages should hinge on the 
wrongdoer's conduct and enlightened social policy, rather than on the 
victim's choice of legal theory or form of action. The shibboleth of 
actual loss to measure compensatory contempt has been abandoned, 
the courts often confer the contemnor's gain on the plaintiff. Judges 
should follow the remedial structure of the substantive theory underly-
ing the injunction. If punitive damages are available in a separate ac-
tion for breach of the legal duty apart from the ip.junction, for example, 
the judge should not force the plaintiff to file a second action for dam-
95. But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (one dollar nominal award). 
96. Schubach v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 308 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1973). 
97. D. DoBBS, supra note 6, § 3.9, at 205; Mellor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a 
Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1980). 
98. Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 780, 787 
(1943). 
99. Sullivan, Punitive lJamoges in the Low of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal 
Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977). 
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ages. 100 This strengthens the legal duty by authorizing punitive dam-
ages in compensatory contempt on the same terms as in direct action 
for violation of a legal duty. 
The fact that compensatory contempt is a remedy of the equity 
courts, moreover, should not bar punitive damages when the facts and 
circumstances otherwise merit. The Alabama Supreme Court recently 
upheld punitive damages in compensatory contempt under its ancillary 
proceeding which makes a jury possible. 101 The notion that equity 
courts may issue only equitable relief and hence only reimbursement is 
fading quickly. An emerging rule holds that punitive damages may be 
imposed in equity as well as in law. 102 In less serious violations, more-
over, equity judges may now punish injunction violators with criminal 
contempt, without a jury. 103 The availability of punitive damages will 
not radically alter judicial power or procedure. Numerous contempt 
opinions illustrate the observation that compensatory contempt adjudi-
cations which create additional incentives to obey injunctions may 
often be salutary. A firm named Golden Rule, for example, had been 
held in contempt eighteen times before it destroyed records that the 
plaintiff could have utilized to assess damages in round nineteen. 104 
Punitive damages for selected compensatory contempt adjudications 
may civilize refractory wrongdoers. If the amount necessary to deter 
exceeds the victim's damages, or if damages are not enough to deter, 
courts should consider either public enforcement or the imposition of 
additional costs. 105 In this context, public enforcement may mean 
criminal contempt. A punitive award, however, admonishes, punishes, 
and deters with the same force as a criminal contempt fine. 106 
Punitive damages for compensatory contempt also advance the 
policies of the inadequacy prerequisite in the same way that payment 
of the criminal fine to the plaintiff does. Both fill the gap between the 
plaintiffs measurable damages and his legally recognized impairment. 
Punitive damages ameliorate otherwise uncompensated losses by prov-
ing a money substitute for the immeasurable impairment that caused 
the judge to enjoin initially. 107 The award of punitive damages, conse-
100. See In re Barney's Boats of Chicago, 616 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1980) (separate tort action 
for punitive damages). 
101. Moody v. State ex rei. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116 (Ala.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). 
The court had previously approved punitive damages "under the usual rules." Lightsey v. Ken-
sington Mortgage & Fin. Co., 294 Ala. 281, 288, 315 So. 2d 431, 437 (1975). 
102. See D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.9, at 211. 
103. See id. § 2.9, at 95. 
104. Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 473 (2d Cir. 1958) (Lum-
bard, J., dissenting). See also Moody v. State ex rei. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116 (Ala.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 910 (I 978) (repeated violations). 
105. R. POSNER, supra note 44, at§ 7.2. 
106. See Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 1563, 1592-93 (1975). 
107. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HAsTINGS L.J. 
639. 643 ( 1980). 
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quently, promotes the inadequacy prerequisite. Because punitive dam-
ages are, in this setting, designed to compensate the plaintiff, the award 
cannot be viewed as a pernicious and illegitimate windfall to the plain-
tiff. 
One cannot, however, equate a contemnor's misconduct and 
mental state, which led to punitive damages, with a plaintiff's immea-
surable impairment, which led to the injunction. Punitive damages are 
therefore an inaccurate and incomplete way to vindicate the policies of 
the inadequacy prerequisite. 
As an alternative method of achieving the policies underlying the 
inadequacy prerequisite, one can look to the law of criminal contempt. 
Although punitive damages cannot be equated with criminal punish-
ment, 108 in the spectrum of society's remedies, punitive damages and 
criminal fines perform similar functions. They transfer assets from 
contemners and defendants to victims and governments. What the 
wrongdoer loses, someone else gains. Much antisocial conduct is sub-
ject to both criminal and civil sanctions. Punitive damages for com-
pensatory contempt encourage private enforcement 109 and victims 
recover damages in civil actions for conduct that the state may seek to 
punish. Thus, instead of imposing criminal fines, courts could allow 
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in compensatory contempt. 
Judges may punish injunction violators for criminal contempt. 
Prosecutorial discretion and enhanced procedural protection often in-
sulate criminal contemners. Because the procedural protections of 
criminal contempt are not available in compensatory contempt, how-
ever, does not mean that punitive damages should be unavailable when 
108. Moody v. State ex ref. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116, 1120 (Ala.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 
(1978). In criminal contempt, the judge initiates a separate action for criminal contempt relegat-
ing the plaintiff to a complaining witness. 0. FlSS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 19-20 (1978). 
The victim sues for punitive damages and a plaintiff commences compensatory contempt as part 
of the injunction action. In contrast to juryless compensatory contempt established by a civil 
s~andard of proof, criminal contempt is governed by criminal procedure; it includes proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and perhaps a jury. Criminal contempt's protections rest on the premise that 
incorrect criminal convictions are more serious than erroneous acquittals, because imprisoning a 
defendant deprives society of the prisoner's enterprise, as well as depriving the prisoner of liberty. 
R. POSNER, supra note 44, § 21.3. 
Legislatures choose criminal sanctions for serious antisocial conduct. Conduct labeled crimi-
nal is hard to detect, and the increased sanction reflects the infrequency of apprehension. More-
over, criminals often dissipate their ill-gotten gains promptly, and they are usually unable to 
indemnify their victims. Criminal conduct, moreover, often threatens the victim's life or limb, 
causing losses that are noncompensable. Finally, criminals more often commit their depredations 
against strangers. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351, 375 n.76 (1978). 
Typical breaches of injunctions fit almost none of these criteria for identifying hard core 
crimes. The plaintiff knows the contemnor at least well enough to have sued to enjoin. Courts 
may enjoin crimes but usually not violent crimes, particularly those commited against strangers. 
Judges apparently conclude that the universal prohibitions of the criminal code, together with the 
stitfer penalties, suffice to deter. Moir v. Moir, 182 Iowa 370, 165 N.W. 1001 (1918). Plaintiffs 
who were alert and litigious enough to find the courthouse once may be counted on to enforce 
injunctions. The risk of being deprived of assets discourages wrongdoing; the recipient of the 
assets is irrelevant. 
109. D. DoBBS, supra note 6, § 3.9, at 221; R. PosNER, supra note 44, §§ 6.12, 22.1 & 22.2. 
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adopting compensatory contempt as a remedy. Except for the absence 
of a jury, the procedural protections in compensatory contempt are the 
same as those in a civil action seeking punitive damages. The same 
judge who would grant the punitive damages, moreover, exercises 
prosecutorial discretion to commence criminal contempt. 
Compensatory contempt is strict liability in the sense that a judge 
cannot exonerate the contemnor merely because he breached the in-
junction with a blameless state of mind. Criminal contempt, by con-
trast, includes an intent element called wantonness or wilfulness. 110 
Aggravated misconduct animated by a malicious mental state, more-
over, is normally a prerequisite for punitive damages. 111 If courts 
choose to follow the substantive standard and grant punitive damages 
in compensatory contempt, they should accommodate punitive dam-
ages to criminal contempt fines by equating punitive damage malice 
with criminal contempt wilfulness, concluding that punitive damages 
punish and deter as much as criminal contempt fines, replacing many 
criminal contempt fines with punitive damages, and forbidding crimi-
nal contempt fines after punitive compensatory proceedings. 112 Courts 
should retain the option of regulating serious violations with criminal 
jail sentences. They might also couple punitive damages with jail in 
exacerbated contempt situations. 
Courts should add punitive damages to compensatory contempt 
awards when merited by the facts and authorized by the substantive 
standard embodied in the injunction. Punitive compensatory contempt 
advances the underlying substantive standard. Punitive damages also 
supply an inadequate but nonetheless remedial equivalent for some of 
the impalpable, subjective impairment that led the court to originally 
enjoin. To this extent, the award of punitive damages reflects the inad-
equacy prerequisite. Finally, punitive damages replace criminal con-
tempt fines with private enforcement. 
3. Distinguishing Criminal from Compensatory Contempt: Eradicating 
the Actual Loss Rule 
As demonstrated, courts should not limit compensatory contempt 
awards to actual losses supported by evidence. A broader view of dam-
ages can be considered in civil contempt and nonetheless comport with 
the policy the Supreme Court announced in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co. 113 In Gompers, the court differentiated between criminal 
and civil contempt. Contempt designed solely to punish the violation 
of a court order is considered criminal contempt and deserves all the 
I 10. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 183, 261-65 (1971). 
Ill. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.9, at 205. 
112. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive IJamages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
639, 658, 664 (1980). 
I 13. 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
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procedural safeguards accorded a criminal proceeding. On the other 
hand, contempt that is coercive or remedial in nature is civil con-
tempt.ll4 
In the heat of conflict, judges and litigants may lose sight of con-
tempt's compensatory role and concentrate on punishment. The rule 
that actual damages be proved prevents the judge from punishing the 
contemnor under the guise of compensating the plaintiff and, thus, pro-
tects the contemnor's right to criminal procedure before criminal pun-
ishment. 115 The plaintiff cannot set up or entrap the contemnor and 
impose a "criminal" penalty without criminal procedure, 116 particu-
larly when the penalty represents a windfall to the plaintiff. 
If an ostensible compensatory award actually punishes, then it is 
really a criminal fine. Under the proved actual damage rule, the appel-
late court has several alternatives. It may reverse the criminal fine ei-
ther because it followed civil procedure117 or because the plaintiff failed 
to adduce evidence of damage to support a compensatory award. 118 Fi-
nally, it may reduce the award to the amount the plaintiff proved. 119 
The proved actual damages rule, however, has not cured all the 
maladies that result from confusing the purposes of criminal contempt 
with the purposes of compensatory contempt. Courts have evaded the 
actual damage limitation by fining the contemnor and awarding a frac-
tion of the fine to the private plaintiff. 120 On the apparent pretext of 
punishing the contemnor, courts also have approved estimated "com-
pensatory" damages in round figures. 121 Other courts affirm severely 
inadequate round-figure contemgt awards either because they are less 
than the plaintiffs' actual losses 22 or on the incorrect theory that the 
amount of compensatory contempt is within the trial judge's discre-
tion. 123 Clearly defined and intelligible distinctions that serve proper 
policies would end this confusion and injustice. 124 
114. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 2.9, at 97-98 n.l9. 
115. Christensen Eng'r Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 135 F. 774, 782 (2d Cir. 1905); 
Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 
327 (1977); Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 186 N.W. 787 (1922). 
116. Judelsohn v. Black, 64 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1933). 
117. Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992, 998 (5th Cir. 1966). 
118. Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 158 Ind. App. 445, 459-60, 303 N.E.2d 50, 57-58 
(1973). 
119. Lewis v. Lorenz, 144 Colo. 23, 354 P.2d 1008 (1960). 
120. In re Christensen Eng'r Co., 194 U.S. 458 (1904); Christensen Eng'r Co. v. Westinghouse 
Air Brake Co., 135 F. 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1905); Merchants Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade of 
Chicago, 201 F. 20, 30 (8th Cir. 1912). 
121. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Health v. Cumberland Cattle Co., 361 Mass. 817,832,282 
N.E.2d 895, 905 (1972); Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 349, 65 N.E.2d 555, 558 
(1946). 
122. Crane v. Gas Screw Happy Pappy, 367 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1966); Chadwick v. Al-
leshouse, 250 Ind. 348, 356-57, 233 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (1968). 
123. Long Island R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 298 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 
(E.D.N.Y. 1969); Folk v. Wallace Bus. Forms, Inc., 394 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1968) .. 
124. See, e.g., Thomas v. Woolen, 255 Ind. 612,615-16,266 N.E.2d 20,22 (1971); Duemling 
v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, 243 Ind. 521, 524-25 188 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1963). See also 
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The proved actual damage rule also prevents windfalls for plain-
tiffs, created when courts confuse coercive and compensatory contempt. 
Judges often appear to lose sight of compensatory contempt, 125 viewing 
civil contempt only as coercive to assure that the contemnor obeys in 
the future. This view, of course, leads to other problems. Judges, as 
already discussed, may remit to separate damage actions victims in-
jured when the defendant breaches the injunctions. 126 Both coercive 
and compensatory contempt contemplate the payment of money. The 
judge may be tempted to overcompensate the plaintiff by utilizing an 
ostensibly compensatory award to coerce the defendant. He· may either 
order that a coercive daily fine on the contemnor be paid to the plaintiff 
or be satisfied with liberal proof of compensatory damages. 127 Appel-
late courts sometimes reverse these "compensatory" awards because 
they are not based on proved actual damages. 128 
While growing out of significant policies, compensatory con-
tempt's rule that actual damages be proved fails to work uniformly and 
satisfactorily. The present rule, moreover, often retards the policies of 
the substantive theory on which the injunction is based. More diffuse 
yet more precise measurement rules will better serve the policies of the 
substantive law. The policy of preventing criminal punishment without 
criminal procedure will normally be furthered by requiring satisfactory 
proof of compensable loss under the remedial formula appropriate to 
the plaintiff's substantive theory. 
B. Vindicating the Inadequacy Prerequisite 
Courts select and measure remedies to carry out policies. Reme:.. 
dial devices seldom have a single purpose or function. One part of 
compensatory contempt advances the substantive purposes of the un-
derlying cause of action. Although advancement of the substantive 
purposes may strengthen, or at least not retard, the policies of the inad-
equacy prerequisite, other devices are particularly designed to advance 
the policies of the inadequacy prerequisite. 
General Elec. Co. v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 576, 580-81 (W.O. Pa. 1958) (court approved consent 
decree allowing coercive-liquidated figure to plaintiff on violation, where amount was not exces-
sive or unreasonable). 
125. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc., v. United States, 605 F.2d '1348 (5th Cir. 1979). For exam-
ple, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently said that a compensatory 
award would have at best a tangential effect in coercing future compliance with the Court's 
decree. The sort of relief sought by the governrnent here, monetary damages for individual 
housing discriminatees, is a purely legaf remedy . . . which compensates for past wrongs. 
The enforcement purpose of a contempt order is much better served by ordering, as was done 
here, the payment of a daily fine in the event of noncompliance with the Court's order. 
/d. at 1356-57. 
126. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 92 F. Supp. 352 (D. Minn. 
!950); Odom v. Langston, 213 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1948). 
127. Thomas v. Woolen, 255 Ind. 612, 615-16, 266 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1971); Duemling v. Fort 
Wayne Community Concerts, 243 Ind. 521, 524-25, 188 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1963). 
128. Brown v. Brown, 183 Colo. 356, 516 P.2d 1129 (1973). 
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1. Attorney's Fees 
Contempt orders--compensatory, coercive and sometimes crimi-
nal-normally add the expense of enforcing and defending the injunc-
tion to the amount of the fine, including costs and fees for the plaintiffs 
attorney. 129 This contrasts with the usual American rule that, absent a 
contract or statute, courts will not allow prevailing litigants to recover 
attorney's fees from losers. 130 The cost of enforcing an injunction with 
a contempt order is a recognized exception to the general rule. 131 Even 
states that force plaintiffs to sue in separate lawsuits or ancillary gro-
ceedings authorize plaintiffs to recover the costs of enforcement. 13 
Several valid reasons support augmented contempt awards. Dam-
ages generally omit transaction costs. Thus, a winning plaintiff nets 
less than out-of-pocket expenses, unless the theory comprehends pain 
and suffering or another attorney's fee component. If the defendant 
wins, each litigant loses the amount their attorney received. Because of 
the transaction costs received by lawyers, litigation is worse than a 
zero-sum game. Allowing the plaintiff to recover from the contemnor 
the cost of enforcing the injunction removes some of plaintiffs disin-
centive. Considering that the contemnor violated a clearly stated legal 
duty to plaintiff, moreover, the award of attorney's fees is fair. Absent 
an injunction, judges award fees to the winner when the loser obdu-
rately or oppressively refuses to honor a clear legal duty. 133 Attorney's 
fees in compensatory contempt actions resemble the obduracy excep-
tion to the usual rule. 134 
Courts issue an injunction either when money damages for dis-
obeying the substantive standard are difficult or impossible to compute 
or when the plaintiffs interest is so important that money damages can-
129. See, e.g., Northside Realty Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 
1979); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1979); David v. 
Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 421 (9th Cir. 1977); Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook 
County, 533 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1976); Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 827 
(5th Cir. 1976); National Research Bureau v. Kueker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
Frankel v. Moskovitz, 503 S.W.2d 428, 433-34 (Mo. App. 1973). The plaintiff normally will not 
receive attorney's fees for criminal contempt. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 501, 175 P.2d 387 
(1946). If the judge appoints the plaintiff's attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt charge, the 
plaintiff will recover only the cost of prosecuting the civil contempt. The judge, moreover, will 
refuse to allow the plaintiff to recover for prosecuting the criminal contempt. Backo v. Local281, 
438 F.2d 176, 183 n.5 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Moody v. State ex ref. 
Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (Ala.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). Cf. 47th & State Currency 
Exch., Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp., 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 235, 371 N.E.2d 294, 299 (1978); but see 
Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1301 (E.D. Va. 1973) (separate motion for attorney's 
fees); Jaikins v. Jaikins, 12 Mich. App. 115, 122, 162 N.W.2d 325, 329-30 (1968). 
130. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 4421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). 
131. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923). Accord, Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.l4 (1978) (dicta). 
132. Moody v. State ex ref. Payne, 355 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (Ala.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 710 
(1978); Kasparek v. May, 178 Neb. 425, 427, 133 N.W.2d 614, 617 (1965). 
133. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. ll6, 129 (1974); Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 
527, 530-31 (1962). 
134. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978). 
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not suffice for the harm that would result from the defendant's interfer-
ence. After the contemnor violates an injunction, handing the 
proprietor only the contemnor's profit or the proprietor's loss frustrates 
the decision to ·enjoin. Authorizing successful plaintiffs to recover the 
costs of enforcement encourages implementation of the legal standard. 
The cost to enforce may be thought to supply a rough equivalent to the 
subjective or impalpable impairment that initially led the court to en-
join. Adding the cost of enforcment to a compensatory contempt 
award, moreover, makes enforcement of the injunction nearly costless 
to the plaintiff and makes the breach more costly to the contemnor than 
the victim's loss. Further, the order to reimburse the successful plaintiff 
for the cost of obtaining a damage verdict may discourage the contem-
nor from flouting the legal standard. 135 Taking the cost of enforcement 
from the contemnor and paying it to the plaintiff advances the policies 
underlying both the inadequacy prerequisite and the decision to enjoin. 
Because of the policy underlying the decision to allot the cost of en-
forcement to the plaintiff, symmetry is unnecessary. Consequently, 
perceptive courts will deny defense costs to contemners exonerated of 
contempt. 136 
The attorney's fee award is also sound economic policy. Compen-
satory contempt orders often arise from injunctions protecting statutory 
monopoly interests, such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks, that 
are designed to subsidize innovative activity. The proprietor accepts 
consideration, in return for a waiver of the monopoly. 137 The bargain-
ing process leads the proprietor to exchange the opportunity costs of 
the monopoly for the potential licensee's money. The process maxi-
mizes the asset's value by placing the right to exercise the monopoly in 
the hands of licensees able to exploit it most efficiently. It also utilizes 
the competitive process to assess and recognize the innovation's value. 
The contemnor causes this bargaining process to go awry, first by 
infringing on the protected interest and triggering an injunction and, 
second, by breaching the injunction. This substitutes two expensive ju-
dicial transactions, the injunction and the contempt proceedings, for 
inexpensive private bargaining. By authorizing injunctions in the stat-
utes, 138 Congress intended to prevent firms from infringing on the stat-
utory monopolies and then merely paying damages to the proprietors 
for what amounted, in effect, to a payment for the right to exploit a 
legally-protected right reserved exclusively to the plaintiff. Simply 
compelling the contemnor to satisfy the proprietor's loss will not en-
135. !d. 
136. Hensley v. Board of Educ. of Unified School Dist. No. 443, 210 Kan. 858, 864, 504 P.2d 
184, 189-90 (1972); Glo-Klen Co., Inc. v. Far West Chern. Prod. Co., 53 Wash. 2d 9, 12, 330 P.2d 
180, 182 (Wash. 1958). 
137. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 
76 YALE L.J. 267, 276 (1966). 
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. II 1978); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1976). 
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courage the firm to substitute bargaining for coerced judicial transac-
tions. But forcing the contemnor to pay most of the expenses of the 
second judicial transaction may inhibit disobedience and encourage the 
contemnor to come to terms with the proprietor in a private market 
transaction. To encourage private bargaining, the courts calculate con-
tempt damages by adding the additional expense of the coerced trans-
action to the victim's damages. 139 
Appellate courts often hold that trial courts have discretion in 
compensatory contempt proceedings to grant attorney's fees 140 and that 
the contemnor's wilfulness in violating the injunction is one factor that 
permits attorneys' fees awards. 141 Because the decision to grant fees is 
discretionary, the judge may deny them for poor reasons or for no rea-
son at all. The cost of enforcement, including attornets fees, should be 
a standard component of compensatory awards. 14 If enforcement 
costs are to fulfill the twin functions of making injunction enforcement 
inexpensive and advancing the inadequacy prerequisite, then judges 
should grant enforcement costs when the plaintiff shows that the con-
temnor breached the injunction. When the contemnor disobeys an in-
junction, judges should be stripped of the discretion to refuse to 
compensate the victim for recognized compensatory contempt dam-
ages.I43 
Similarly, some courts refuse to award enforcement costs or attor-
ney's fees in the absence of a demonstration of the defendants' wilful-
ness. This refusal frustrates the inadequacy prerequisite. Courts in 
compensatory contempt pt:oceedings appear to have transferred the 
wilfulness requirement either from the law of criminal contempt or 
from the obduracy exception to the general rule barring attorneys' fees. 
But compensatory contempt includes no mental element. Upon breach 
of the injunction, the contemnor should indemnify all of the plaintiff's 
recognized losses. The award should embrace the expenses of enforc-
ing the injunction. The cost to the victim of investigating and prosecut-
ing the violation of injunctions does not vary in relation to whether the 
contemnor's conduct was serene, negligent, or wilful. To offset the un-
compensable impairment that led the judge to enjoin, the mental state 
of the violator should not be dispositive of the amount of compensation 
139. q. R. POSNER, supra note 44, § 7.2. 
140. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923); Siebring v. Hansen, 
346 F.2d 474, 480-81 (8th Cir. 1965); In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 
1955); Berman v. Berman, 232 Ga. 342, 206 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1974). 
141. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975) (dicta); 
Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (dicta); Vuitton et Fils 
S.A. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 
227 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1955). 
142. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923); World's Finest 
Chocolate, Inc. v. World Candies, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
143. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1979) (nevertheless 
referring to attorney fees as hinging on wilfullness); Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 
1956); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946). 
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due. 144 
Many compensatory contempt cases grow out of injunctions that 
protect copyright and patent interests. Counsel fees are available in 
separate infringement actions 145 but in infringement actions them-
selves, courts restrict fees to exceptional or exacerbated instances. 146 If 
compensatory contempt courts grant fees as part of the cost of enforc-
ing injunctions and vindicating the inadequacy prerequisite, the judge's 
compensatory contempt inquiry should follow the more lenient com-
pensatory contempt standard and reject the strict standard of the un-
derlying substantive remedy. 147 This article has argued that the 
"compensatory" part of compensatory contempt awards should be 
measured by the substantive standard embodied in the injunction. The 
"compensatory" part of the award should serve that substantive stan-
dard. The costs of enforcement should promote the inadequacy pre-
requisite, a distinct policy. Courts exempt compensatory contempt 
from the general rule that bars recovery of attorney's fees. For the 
same reasons, they should exempt the costs of enforcing compensatory 
contempt from the statutory and judicial standards of specialized sub-
stantive areas. 
Placing the cost to enforce on the wrongdoer fosters the idea that 
the plaintiff should enjoy the substantive right in dispute, instead of a 
mere money substitute. Courts issue injunctions to protect impalable 
interests too important to be valued in money or too speculative to as-
certain. A contemnor's violation of an injunction injures the plaintiff in 
a way the judge has already said cannot or should not be measured in 
money. Consequently, courts should automatically grant enforcement 
costs in all compensatory contempt cases. To advance the inadequacy 
prerequisite, a defendant who disobeys an injunction should reimburse 
the plaintiff for the cost of policing it even though the plaintiff cannot 
prove any compensable damage other than the cost of enforcement. 148 
144. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1977). But cf. David v. 
Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 420 (9th Cir. 1977) (wilfullness not relevant to violation but bears on 
sanction); Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no violation found; attorney 
fees nevertheless granted in order to secure compliance). Two decisions which deny attorney fees, 
apparently because the plaintiff unreasonably pressed contempt, are In re Federal Facilities Re-
alty Trust, 227 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1955) and Freeman v. Premier Mach. Co., 25 F. Supp. 927 (D. 
Mass. 1938). 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (Supp. II 1978); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976). 
146. Park-In-Theatres, v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1951). 
147. See, e.g., Northside Realty Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356 n.23 (5th 
Cir. 1979); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 665 (2d Cir. 1970); Dow Chern. Co. v. 
Chemical Cleaning, Inc., 434 E2d 1212, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Ransburg Electo-Coating 
Corp. v. Procter Elec. Co., 242 F. Supp. 28, 39 (D. Md. 1965). 
148. See, e.g., Allied Materials Corp. v. Superior Prods. Co., 620 F.2d 224 (lOth Cir. 1980); 
Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 533 F.2d 344,351 (7th Cir. 1976); Wad-
sworth Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse E1ec. Co., 71 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1934); Powell v. Ward, 487 
F. Supp. 917, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re American Assoc'd Sys., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 977, 979-90 
(E.D. Ky. 1974); United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay's Stores, Inc., 361 Mass. 35, 278 N.E.2d 716 
(1972); R.E. Harrington, Inc. v. Frick, 446 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. App. 1969); Arvin, Inc. v. Sony Corp. 
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To match the remedy with the reason for enjoining, the plaintiff should 
be able to enforce an injunction without expense, and the contemnor 
should pay more than the victim would recover in a separate damage 
action. In pursuit of this goal, one judge went so far as to promote 
compliance by charging the contemnor with the plaintiff's attorney's 
fees, even though he found that the contemnor had not technically 
breached the injunction. 149 
The older view was that a successful contempt plaintiff recovers 
reasonable attorney's fees, evaluated in light of judicial expertise about 
the value of legal services. The judge determined the amount of fees 
without taking actual evidence. 150 In the last decade, however, courts 
have developed more specific mechanisms for granting and measuring 
counsel fees, particularly in bankruptcy and civil rights litigation. They 
have also exercised greater pragmatism, insisting that plaintiffs prove 
the amount of fees. 151 Increasingly, compensatory contempt courts are 
adopting this approach. 152 The requirement of factual support for 
counsel fees advances the purpose of compensatory contempt more 
than judicial estimation of those fees because it inhibits parsimonious 
awards 153 that discourage plaintiffs from enforcing injunctions. 
2. Preaward Interest 
Preaward interest may be viewed as part of the cost of enforcing 
an injunction. Augmenting the compensation award by the amount of 
the preaward interest wou~d therefore further the policies underlying 
the inadequacy prerequisite. Although little judicial or scholarly atten-
tion has been granted this question, several state and federal court 
opinions in Massachusetts infer that a compensatory contempt award 
should include interest granted from the time of breach. 154 
of America, 215 Va. 704, 213 S.E.2d 753 (1975) (attorney fees without nominal damages where 
contemnor sold property in violation of Fair Trade injunction). 
149. Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dicta). 
150. Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F.2d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 1930); Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. 
Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 242, 186 N.W. 787, 789 (1922); Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, 
Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 807 (1943). 
151. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
152. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1977); Preston v. Man-
deville, 451 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Andre Matenciot, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 422 F. 
Supp. 1199, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
153. Dow Chern. Co. v. Chemical Cleaning, Inc., 434 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1970); Nelson v. 
Steiner, 279 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1960); Coca-Cola v. Bisignano, 343 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Iowa 1972); 
Bonanza lnt'l Inc. v. Corceller, 343 F. Supp. 14, 17 (E.D. La. 1972). 
154. Parker v. United States, 135 F.2d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1943); Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 
370, 380 (1st Cir. 1942) (aggregate amount due the plaintiff from contemnor, with interest); Coyne 
Indus. Laundry v. Gould, 359 Mass. 269,278-79, 268 N.E.2d 848, 854 (1971); Lyon v. Bloomfield, 
355 Mass. 738, 247 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1969). 
In other contexts, courts are antagonistic to preaward interests. In claims for personal injury 
or lost profits, courts regularly deny prejudgment interest because of the rule that interest compu-
tation begins when the clerk enters the judgments, unless the amount of interest could be deter-
mined with reasonable certainty before judgment. D. DoBBS, supra note 6, § 3.5, at 165. Courts 
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Strong policy arguments support a grant of preaward interest in 
compensatory contempt proceedings. Policies underlying the inade-
quacy prerequisite, for example, would be furthered by encouraging 
private bargaining, placing the entire cost of the coerced nonmarket 
transaction on the contemnor, making enforcement of injunctions 
costless to plaintiffs and augmenting compensation to supply a rough 
equivalent for the intangible interests that originally led the judge to 
enjoin. 
The argument for preaward interest in compensatory contempt is 
persuasive for standard remedial reasons and, thus, would further the 
policies of the underlying cause of action. In violating the injunction, 
the contemnor violated a clear legal duty owed to the plaintiff. If the 
plaintiff recovers damages for breaches up to trial, and an injunction 
against future breaches, then compensatory contempt damages are as-
certainable and virtually undisputed. Courts, moreover, often add pre-
judgment interest to restitutionary claims. 155 The plaintiff might argue 
that the injunction created a fiduciary duty owed to him by the contem-
nor, and upon breach the contemnor must account with interest. 156 By 
threatening in the injunction order to add prejudgment interest to any 
compensatory contempt award, judges could also incorporate the 
preaward interest into the breaching party's calculus of the incidental 
costs of a breach. Preaward interest would strengthen both the sub-
stantive standard and the inadequacy prerequisite. 
V. COLLECTING COMPENSATORY CONTEMPT 
Once the trier of fact determines that compensatory contempt is 
due and sets the amount, the plaintiff must collect the award. The 
plaintiff, as a contempt creditor with an equitable decree for money, 
may employ any of the techniques available to a judgment creditor to 
collect a legal judgment. 157 Thus, contempt creditors have used execu-
tion as their principal collection mechanism. 158 Coercive collection 
often becomes imperative because the debtor transfers property to 
others or is simply recalcitrant. In addition to the same proceedings 
available to a judgment creditor, a contempt creditor enjoys the luxury 
of additional collection techniques, for the judge embodies a compen-
also routinely deny prejudgment interest on patent infringement judgments, see, e.g., Swan Car-
buretor Co. v. Nash Motors Co., 133 F.2d 562, 567 (4th Cir. 1943), except on terms similar to 
punitive damages, when the infringer evidences bad faith or wilfulness. See, e.g., Samson-United 
Corp. v. F.A. Smith Mfg. Co., 68 U.S.P.Q. 266 (W.D.N.Y. 1946). 
155. D. DoBBS, supra note 6, § 3.5, at 169-70. 
156. q. Leman v. Krentler-Amold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 456 (1932) (theory of lost 
profit recovery). 
157. See, e.g., In re Meggett, 105 Wise. 291 (1900); VA. CoDE§ 8.01-426 (1977); Cook, The 
Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 106, 116 (1915). 
158. Winner Corp. v. H.A. Caesar & Co., Inc., 511 F.2d 1010, 1013 (6th Cir. 1975); Hadnott v. 
Amos, 325 F. Supp. 777, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Baltz v. Walgreen Co., 198 F. Supp. 22, 26-27 
(W.O. Tenn 1961). 
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satory award in a personal order instead of an impersonal judgment. 
The status of the creditor as a contempt creditor, rather than a mere 
judgment creditor, however, does not justify these additional tech-
niques. 
Legal judgment creditors may immure debtors to discover and col-
lect assets. Under supplementary proceedings to interrogate debtors 
and discover assets, if the debtor fails to appear, disdains to answer, or 
refuses to relinquish property, the judge may order imprisonment for 
coercive contempt until he complies. 159 But courts generally prefer im-
personal execution and garnishment to discovery proceedings enforced 
with personal orders. 160 A judge using these techniques to collect legal 
judgments, moreover, would not order a contemnor confined merely 
because the sheriff returned the execution nulla bona or the contemnor 
failed to pay the clerk or the plaintiff, 161 as may occur with a compen-
satory contempt award. A personal order to a debtor to pay a general 
money judgment enforced by coercive imprisonment is often perceived 
as imprisonment for debt, which most state constitutions prohibit. 162 
Before imprisoning the contemnor, the judge should be certain that the 
judgment debtor is able to obey an order to appear, answer, or convey, 
but refuses to do so. 163 In order to use coercive contempt to extract 
money from a contemnor, the plaintiff must show that the contemnor 
has the capacity to pay. The judge may only require the contemnor to 
perform an act he is capable of performing. If the contemnor demurs, 
the judge, without violating the prohibition, may jail the contemnor 
until compliance. 164 
A wave of humanitarian reform during the nineteenth century 
sharply circumscribed the practice of imprisoning civil debtors. 165 
Most states passed constitutional prohibitions against debt imprison-
ment, and many states have banned body execution. 166 Even where 
159. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-508 (1977). See generally V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 106-07 (2d ed. 1974). Santos, &!forcing Money Judg-
ments Against Personal Property in Virginia, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 731, 768-70 (1980). 
160. Dunlop v. Fisher, 406 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Colo. 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. 
§ 27A.l701(5) (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-8(2) (1969); I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 28 (1940). 
161. See, e.g., Union Tool v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 109 (1922); United States v. Onan, 190 
F.2d I, 5 (8th Cir. 1951); Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 381 (1st Cir. 1942). 
162. Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113 Va. 612, 75 S.E. 145 (1912). See also 
Walling v. Crane, 158 F.2d 80, 85 (5th Cir. 1946); D. DoBBS, supra note 6, § 2.9, at 98-99. 
163. Tudor v. Furebaugh, 364 Ill. 283, 4 N.E.2d 393 (1936); People v. Lamothe, 331 Ill. 351, 
163 N.E. 5 (1928). 
164. Ex parte Ridgley, 261 Mich. 42, 245 N.W. 803 (1932). 
165. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 25-68 (1974). 
166. Neither Maryland nor Virginia have body execution, and the Virginia General Assem-
bly abolished capias ad responendum, the surviving vestige of debt imprisonment, when it revised 
civil procedure in 1977. VA. CODE§ 8.01-575 (1977). Note, Body Attachment and Body Execution: 
Forgotten But Not Gone, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 543, 551 n.52 (1976). North Carolina, however, 
still extends the benefits of body execution to judgment debtors, N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-311 (Supp. 
1977). 
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body execution is still available, creditors may utilize it only for certain 
debts and against certain types of debtors-for example, fraud feasors 
and family support debtors. 167 Due process and equal protection con-
cepts, moreover, currently attenuate the creditor's ability to imprison 
the judgment debtor. 168 
The winds of statutory revision and constitutional limitation, how-
ever, have not swept unencumbered into the law of compensatory con-
tempt. 169 Some courts hold the contemnor directly liable to the court, 
whenever the plaintiff receives his due from the court clerk. 170 Even if 
the contemnor was ordered to pay the plaintiff directly, 171 the judg-
ment's in personam nature removes compensatory contempt awards 
from the usual collection process. The compensatory contemnor may 
be imprisoned until payment of the award, 17 and in several cases com-
pensatory contempt debtors have not only been threatened with impris-
onment, 173 but have been actually jailed. 174 Courts have both asserted 
and exercised the authority to imprison, to collect compensatory con-
tempt, and only then to allow the contemnor to seek release. 175 Judg-
ment creditors, in contrast, are forbidden to imprison without 
167. Note, BodyAIIachment and Body Execution: Forgo/len But Not Gone, 17 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 543, 551-53 (1976). 
168. /d. 
169. See, e.g., Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 109 (1922); Norman Bridge Drug Co. 
v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 828 (5th Cir. 1976). 
170. The Minnesota Supreme Court said that coercive confinement to collect compensatory 
contempt is not the equivalent of imprisonment for debt: 
That a person convicted of contempt, who fails to comply with the judgment imposed there-
for, may be coerced to do so by imprisonment without infringing [the constitutional provision 
forbidding imprisonment for debt], whether the judgment directs the payment of money or 
the doing of some other act, has been settled too long and too firmly to require further discus-
sion or the citation of authorities. 
Campbell v. Motion Pictures Mach. Operators, 151 Minn. 238, 243, 186 N.W. 787,789 (1922). See 
also Trotcky v. Van Sickle, 227 Ind. 441, 85 N.E.2d 638 (1949); Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of 
Health, 158 Ind. App. 445, 463, 303 N.E.2d 50, 59 (1973) ("imprisonment in contempt is not 
imprisonment for debt within the meaning of the Constitution."); White v. Wadhams, 211 Mich. 
658, 663, 179 N.W. 245, 247 (1920). 
171. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Executive Sec. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470, 472 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); My Laundry Co. v. Schmeling, 129 Wise. 597, 603, 109 N.W. 540, 543 (1906). 
172. See, e.g., Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 425 F.2d !Ill (3d Cir. 1970) (trial court order 
reversed); Crane v. Gas Screw Happy Pappy, 367 F.2d 771, 772 (7th Cir. 1966); Eustace v. Lynch, 
80 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1935); Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F.2d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 1930); Socialistic Coop. 
Publishing Ass'n v. Kuhn, 164 N.Y. 473, 58 N.E. 649 (1900); Jastram v. McAuslan, 29 R.I. 390, 71 
A. 454 (1909); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-10-04 (1974); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 2727.12 (Page 1953); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1390 (Supp. 1979-80). 
173. Courts have threatened to jail the contemnor for failing to pay either the clerk of the 
court, Union Tool v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 109 (1922); Parker v. United States, 129 F.2d 374, 375 
n.l (1st Cir. 1942); Trotcky v. Van Sickle, 227 Ind. 441, 448, 85 N.E.2d 638, 641 (1949), or the 
plaintiff directly, Boylan v. Detrio, 187 F.2d 375, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1951); Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 
F.2d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 1930); Chadwick v. Alleshouse, 250 Ind. 348, 357, 233 N.E.2d 162, 167 
(1968). 
174. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d I, 5 (8th Cir. 1951); Hendryz v. Fitzpatrick, 19 F. 810 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1884); Vail v. Quinlin, 406 F. Supp. 951,957 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),rev'dsubnom. Judice 
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); In re Mann, 126 F. Supp. 709, 710 (D. Mass. 1954). 
175. Trotcky v. Van Sickle, 227 Ind. 441, 449, 85 N.E.2d 638, 641-42 (1949); Smith v. Indiana 
State Bd. of Health, 158 Ind. App. 445, 463, 303 N.E.2d 50, 59-60 (1973). 
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employing other devices first. To imprison the debtor, they must con-
vince the judge that the debtor is able to pay, but refuses. 176 Because of 
this greater coercion, contempt debtors are more likely to sell property 
statutorily exempted from execution, 177 thus defeating the statute's pol-
icy of saving a minimum cushion for debtors, and protecting debtors' 
families. 178 
Contempt debtors, however, may not be jailed indefinitely to ex-
tract money which they do not possess. 179 The orders often commit the 
contemnor only "until the Oudge's] further order." 180 Inability to com-
ply, moreover, is a defense to contempt, 181 and the contemnor may be 
released upon demonstrating an inability to pay. 182 One court even 
freed contemners who demonstrated "that confinement would cause 
undue hardship." 183 By declaring bankruptcy, moreover, the contem-
nor may also defeat collection, discharge the debt, and decamp jail. 184 
Finally, the more humane modem view is that coercive imprisonment 
to collect a general money sum for compensatory contempt violates the 
prohibition against imprisonment for civil debt. 185 
Contemners should pay awards to compensate plaintiffs and fur-
ther the policies behind the substantive doctrines and the inadequacy 
prerequisite. But no cogent reason exists to treat compensatory con-
temners more harshly than equity defendants or judgment debtors. 
The reasoning that led policymakers to ban debt imprisonment and to 
limit coercive contempt effectuated important substantive policies. The 
176. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Executive Sec. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470, 473 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
177. See, e.g., Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (indigent imprisoned 
for failure to pay contempt fine released after relative loaned him money), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Judice v. Vail, 403 U.S. 327 (1977). 
178. Vokowich, IJebtor's Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779 (1974). 
179. Boylane v. Detrio, 187 F.2d 375, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1951); Walling v. Crane, 158 F.2d 80, 
85 (5th Cir. 1946); V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 83-84 
(2d ed. 1974). 
180. White v. Wadhams, 211 Mich. 658, 664, 179 N.W. 245, 247 (Mich. 1920); Carnahan v. 
Carnahan, 143 Mich. 390, 399, 107 N.W. 73, 74 (Mich. 1906); Chapel v. Hull, 60 Mich. 167, 26 
N.W. 874, 876 (1886). 
181. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330-34 (1950). 
182. Parker v. United States, 129 F.2d 374, 376 (1st Cir. 1942) (utter inability to pay the fine 
in whole or in part); Hendryx v. Fritzpatrick, 19 F. 810 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884) (contemnor proved he 
had no property and took poor-debtor's oath); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Executive 
Sec. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470,473 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no assets of any kind); Delaware, L. & W. R. 
Co. v. Frank, 230 F. 988,989 (2d Cir. 1916) (dicta); Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 158 Ind. 
App. 445, 463, 303 N.E.2d 50, 59-60 (1973). . 
183. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d I, 9 (8th Cir. 1951). 
184. United States v. Parker, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946); Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 F. 810 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1884); In re Mann, 126 F. Supp. 709 (D. Mass. 1954). The Bankruptcy Act, 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), effective October I, 1979, discharges compensatory damages more clearly than 
the 1898 Act effective in Parker. The contemnor may, however, run afoul of§ 523(a)(6), which 
excepts from discharge liabilities resulting from "willful and malicious injury." 
185. I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 74a, at 126 (1940). See 
also Potter v. Wilson, 609 P.2d 1278 (Okla. 1980) (coercive imprisonment to enforce indemnity 
portion of court order violates ban on debt imprisonment). 
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social welfare policy of protecting debtors and their families was per-
ceived as more important than the furtherance of the substantive law 
and the compensation of plaintiffs. In the same manner, compensatory 
contempt awards advance both the underlying substantive policies and 
the inadequacy prerequisite. The policy of the inadequacy prerequisite 
is sufficiently important to support augmented compensatory contempt 
awards, although it may not be so significant as to overcome the poli-
cies supporting debtor protection. Automatic confinement to collect 
debts only short-circuits the protective devices developed over several 
centuries. Confining or even threatening to confine the contemnor, 
moreover, in order to coerce payment of money that normal judgment 
collection failed to recover, will often be frustrated by the contemnor's 
inability to pay. Imprisonment to collect money that the contemnor 
does not possess is merely punishment under the guise of collection. It 
converts reimbursement into revenge. Simply allowing the contemnor 
to seek release fails to ameliorate the process's injustice, indignity, and 
potential for abuse. Courts should subordinate the compensatory con-
tempt policies to the humanitarian policies expressed by doctrines that 
protect impecunious debtors. 
A compensatory contempt creditor should, however, be authorized 
to employ body execution or coercive imprisonment to collect compen-
satory contempt on the same basis as other creditors. Exceptions, if 
any, should flow from the type of debt or the debtor's conduct. The 
contempt creditor should execute, garnish, and file judgment liens. 
Personal orders should be utilized to satisfy contempt awards only after 
the impersonal devices fail. In supplementary or interrogatory pro-
ceedings to discover assets, the judge should imprison the contemnor 
only if convinced that he is mendacious or able but unwilling to pay. 
In short, courts should treat compensatory contempt awards as subject 
to the same exemptions, exceptions, and processes as other debts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In compensatory contempt proceedings, the judge must fashion a 
money remedy for the breach of an injunction. If, however, money was 
a sufficient remedy, the judge would have refused to enjoin. The judge 
enjoined so that the plaintiff could enjoy the substantive right 
unimpaired. The contemnor breached the injunction and deprived the 
plaintiff of the opportunity to enjoy the right. Thus, the injury the 
judge sought to prevent by enjoining the defendant occurred, making it 
too late to devise an adequate remedy. Simply granting money in com-
pensatory contempt proceedings allows the wealthy contemnor to buy 
the right to continue violating the injunction. The remedial goal of 
constructing a world "as if' the defendant had not disobeyed the in-
junction is unrealistic. The judge must structure a money remedy that 
compensates the plaintiff, advances the underlying substantive purpose 
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and decision to enjoin, allocates risks, encourages private bargaining, 
and maintains or restores legitimacy. 
Compensatory contempt is an incomplete remedy. 186 Assuming 
the defendant has breached the injunction and it is too late to wield 
coercive contempt, the judge considers criminal contempt. If the in-
junction is prohibitory, the defendant is callous, damages are difficult 
to calculate, or the plaintiff fails to show a recognized loss, then either 
criminal contempt or punitive damages is a desirable remedy to further 
the inadequacy prerequisite. 187 The same breach may lead to criminal 
186. Some legally recognized injuries are not susceptible to compensation. For example, one 
judge enjoined the defendant from selling the plaintiff's appliances below the "fair trade" price. 
When the defendant breached the injunction, the plaintiff lost nothing except perhaps the ethereal 
"good will" of manufacturing appliances not sold at discount. The court held that sales that 
violated the Fair Trade Act injunction injured the manufacturer's "good will," which could be 
"compensated" with the seller's profits. Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 
467 (2d Cir. 1958). 
The judge could strip the contemnor of the profits earned while disobeying the order and 
present them to the plaintiff to destroy the contemnor's incentive to violate the injunction. This, 
however, partakes more of bounty than compensation. Moreover, in this particular lawsuit, the 
contemnor lacked records the plaintiff could adduce to prove profits. The Virginia court granted 
only attorney fees when the defendant breached a Fair Trade Act injunction. Arvin, Inc. v. Sony 
Corp. of America, 215 Va. 704, 213 S.E.2d 753 (1975). Similarly, when the contemnor disobeys an 
injunction against using a plaintiff's trademark or trade name but operates noncompetitively and 
without bringing the plaintiff into disrepute, plaintiffs have serious trouble proving damages ex-
cept for attorney fees. National Drying Mach. Co. v. Ackoff, 245 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1957); Frank-
lin Mint Corp. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 360 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
Injuries to political, constitutional, and social interests are often small and impalpable but 
widespread and intolerable. Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386, 398 (E. D. Pa. 1973) (when defend-
ants violated an injunction by forbidding plaintiffs from demonstrating on Independence Mall 
while President Nixon signed the Revenue Sharing Act, the computation of damages was delayed 
pending civil action); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (when de-
fendants disobey an injunction to implement due process in prison discipline, the "court doubts 
that any injury that did occur could be quantified."); Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions: Civil 
and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 780, 824 n.236 (1943); see also Cary v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 
(1978). 
Equity concepts developed to protect old property interests must be adopted to new property 
entitlements. For example, the court enjoined a class of Alabama election officials to include the 
NDPA, a predominately black political party, on the ballot. But the contemnor, a Greene County 
official, omitted the party. The court found that if the party had been on the ballot in Greene 
County, black candidates would have been elected to local offices. After a second election which 
black candidates won, the court told the contemnor to pay salaries lost by the officials who would 
have been elected in a proper first election. But the court said that "other claims . . . are either 
not applicable because said damages were not sustained by parties to this action or are too specu-
lative. . . ." Each citizen of the seven-eighths black county suffered some impairment from the 
unconstitutional election and the continuation of racist rule. Hadnott v. Amos, 325 F. Supp. 777, 
779 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See also Shakman v. Democratice Organization of Cook County, 533 F.2d 
344 (7th Cir. 1976). Compare Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). In a non-constitu-
tional setting, equity concepts also cause the problem of calculating impairment. See United 
States v. Auerbach, 165 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 
95 F. Supp. 1019 (D.D.C. 1951); Brooks v. Brooks, 300 A.2d 531, 535 (Vt. 1973). Compare Kajtazi 
v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (tort action). 
187. See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 472 (2d Cir. 
1958) (Hand, J., concurring). Christensen Eng'r Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 135 F. 774 
(2d Cir. 1905) (conpensatory contempt reversed because actual damages not proved; criminal con-
tempt affirmed). But see Thomas v. Woollen, 255 Ind. 612, 617, 266 N.E.2d 20, 23 (1971) (order 
setting penalty for violation struck down). 
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and compensatory contempt, 188 or both. 189 Criminal contempt differs 
from compensatory contempt in both purpose and effect. 190 The line 
between punishing wrongdoers and compensating victims is difficult to 
ascertain in view of the multiple remedial policies expressed in, for ex-
ample, the areas of punitive damages, multiplied damages, and dam-
ages measured by the magnitude of the wrong. The principal purpose 
of criminal contempt is to vindicate the public interest in obedience to 
orders. Its minatory features incidentally benefit the plaintiff and fur-
ther private interests. Criminal and compensatory contempt are some-
times parallel, sometimes divergent, and even when combined, often 
leave the plaintiff with a less than perfect remedy. 191 
Compensatory contempt opinions too often belabor obvious points 
and miscue too many easy issues. Few states possess a developed the-
ory of compensatory contempt, and the entire federal system has failed 
to generate a well-articulated theory. This impedes the routine admin-
istration of many important doctrines. Consequently, this article repre-
sents a modest effort to give form and consistency to vague, conflicting, 
and often disconnected statements. Stating and articulating a compen-
satory contempt doctrine reveals that remedial policy issues have been 
188. Backo v. Local 281, 308 F. Supp. 172, 175 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). 
189. In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Hadnott v. Amos, 325 Supp. 777 
(M.D. Ala. 1971); See also Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 F. 810, 811 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884); Root v. 
MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 363, 157 N.E. 684, 691 (1927). 
190. Criminal contempt reduces the plaintiff to a complaining witness. The judge retains the 
discretion to initiate and terminate criminal contempt. In re United Corp., 166 F. Supp. 343, 345-
46 (D. Del. 1958); 0. F1ss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 18-22 (1978); Cohan & Hayes, Con-
tempt Proceedings: Another Dimension to Consumer Protection, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. I, 22 
(1980). The court often appoints the plaintiff's attorney to prosecute. Backo v. Local 281, 438 
F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 1970); Chemical Fireproofing Co. v. Bronska, 553 S.W.2d 710,715-16 (Mo. 
App. 1977); Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1086-87 (1965); State ex 
rel Gentry v. Becker, 174 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1943) (attorney appointed to prosecute criminal con-
tempt need not be paid by government); see also cases cited in note 127 infra. Criminal contempt 
is a crime, and criminal procedure governs. In particular, proof of criminal contempt must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the state must prove that the contempt was wanton. 
Thus, in a combined proceeding, a judge may grant a compensatory award but exonerate the 
contemnor of criminal contempt. Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 830 (5th Cir. 
1976); Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. 
Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., 230 F. 120, 132-34 (1916). 
When criminal contempt is employed, the contemnor faces the risk of imprisonment, in addi-
tion to the possibility of a significant monetary fine. Prison doors possess a unique capacity to 
alter incentives. But criminal contempt statutes often limit contempt fines. By contrast, compen-
satory contempt awards may exceed a statutory fine limit. Smith v. Indiana State Bd. of Health, 
158 Ind. App. 445, 467, 303 N.E.2d 50, 61 (1973). Although the government receives the criminal 
fine, see, e.g., Hyde Con~tr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702, 715-16 (S.D. Miss. 1974), the 
contemnor's payment of money retains its punitive effect. Although bankruptcy will discharge 
. some compensatory contempt judgments, the obligation to pay a criminal contempt fine is not 
obviated by insolvency. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946); Hendryx v. Fitzpat-
rick, 19 F. 810, 811-13 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884) (dicta); II U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (Supp. II 1978); In re 
Mann, 126 F. Supp. 709 (D. Mass. 1954). 
191. See Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The court held that 
where a prisoner's privileged mail was opened, criminal contempt was not warranted, because the 
conduct was not wilful. In addition, no compensatory contempt was in order because mental 
anguish is not a proper element of compensatory damages. 
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neglected in compensatory contempt proceedings. Embedded in the 
doctrine are kernels of truth, but these truths are so concealed that 
courts often respond with ritual incantations of cliche. Articulating the 
doctrine places its deficiencies in perspective and allows a systematic 
consideration of the problems of effectively fashioning a consistent and 
fair remedy for the violation of court-ordered injunctions. 
